



Domestic Violence Torts: Righting a Civil Wrong 
Camille Carey* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Tort law defines what constitutes wrongful conduct in particular 
situations and dictates how tortfeasors legally compensate for their wrongful 
conduct.  Sometimes tort law governs conduct in intimate relations, and 
other times it oversees the conduct of strangers or corporations.  Tort law, 
especially personal injury law, has become an integral aspect of American 
society.  It guides how individuals and companies conduct themselves and 
dictates how and when injured parties are compensated for their harms.  
Domestic violence harms have been conspicuously absent from the 
development of tort law.  Domestic violence is pervasive, and its harms are 
serious.  Pain and suffering, physical injuries, and even death arising out of 
abusive relationships are compensable through tort law, but these claims are 
rarely filed or discussed. 
In its current iteration, tort law offers a number of well-suited but 
underused remedies for domestic violence victims.  These common law 
claims were not created to provide redress for intimate partner violence, and 
historically were not allowed to do so.  However, in contemporary times, tort 
claims are effective tools for legal recourse for domestic violence victims 
and should be pursued aggressively and frequently.
1
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 1.  I will refer to domestic violence victims as females throughout, given that the vast majority 
of domestic violence victims are women.  PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 183781, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, at iv (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-
sum/183781.htm (finding that “[a]pproximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are physically 
assaulted by an intimate partner annually in the United States”); JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 235508, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010, at 10 
(2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2224 (finding that “[t]he 
percentage of female victims (22%) of intimate partner violence was about 4 times that of male 
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The common law doctrines of chastisement, coverture, and spousal 
immunity historically shielded abusers from tort liability for domestic 
violence.  Now that these sexist doctrines have lost their hold, tort law is ripe 
for use in the domestic violence context.  Domestic violence victims can use 
existing common law and statutory tort causes of action—such as battery, 
assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—to sue their abusers 
for abusive conduct.  Existing common law causes of action and a very 
small collection of newer tort claims provide easy avenues for development 
in this area of law.  Through tort suits, victims can achieve financial 
compensation for harms, assume a position of control over legal claims 
addressing the abuse, experience both power and agency in an otherwise 
subordinating relationship, and seek deterrence of an abuser’s abusive 
conduct. 
This paper will discuss both traditional and specific tort claims that can 
be brought by domestic violence victims.  It explores the dearth of domestic 
violence tort claims and looks at historical and contemporary factors causing 
the dearth of such claims.  It sets forth the many benefits offered by tort law 
for domestic violence plaintiffs and proposes a paradigm shift in domestic 
violence lawyering to incorporate significantly more tort litigation. 
Part I provides an overview of existing tort causes of action that are well 
suited for use by domestic violence victims.  These tort actions include 
traditional common law claims like assault, battery, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.  They also include several local and state tort claims 
for domestic violence and gender-motivated violence.  The civil rights 
remedy under the Violence Against Women Act is discussed briefly to give 
context to the development of specific tort claims for gender-motivated and 
domestic violence.  Part II describes the dearth of domestic violence tort 
claims and offers reasons why so few domestic violence tort claims have 
been brought.  It examines how the common law history of chastisement, 
coverture, spousal immunity, and judicial obstinacy has barred these claims 
and affects the frequency of these claims today.  This section also describes 
how insurance policy exclusions and other factors have contributed to the 
sparseness of domestic violence tort claims.  Part III explores how tort 
claims can be productive avenues of relief for domestic violence victims.  
Positive potential outcomes for domestic violence plaintiffs include financial 
benefits, therapeutic benefits, and deterrence.  Part IV discusses some 
shortcomings of tort law in remedying domestic violence harms.  Part V 
proposes a paradigm shift in legal approaches to domestic violence, with 
                                                          
victims (5%)”). 
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domestic violence tort law occupying a more significant role. 
II: TORT CLAIMS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS: COMMON LAW 
TORTS, VAWA, AND LOCAL AND STATE CLAIMS FOR DOMESTIC OR 
GENDER-RELATED VIOLENCE 
A. Common Law Claims 
Pursuing common law tort claims should become a prominent approach 
within domestic violence law, leading a paradigm shift in how law can be 
used to combat abuse.  Tort claims offer ready-made remedies that can 
provide meaningful financial and emotional benefits to domestic violence 
victims.  Physical violence, sexual abuse, mental abuse, and other abusive 
behaviors in domestic violence relationships often create liability in tort.  
Common law torts, including negligence, recklessness, and especially 
intentional torts, can provide domestic violence victims with benefits not 
necessarily offered by other legal actions. 
Intentional torts are effective vehicles for seeking redress for domestic 
violence harms.  The types of abuse frequently perpetrated in domestic 
violence relationships tend to meet the elements of intentional torts, and thus 
many acts of domestic violence are actionable.  The most pertinent causes of 
action for domestic violence harms include battery, assault, false 
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Each will be 
addressed in turn. 
1.  Battery 
A battery occurs when the defendant intends to make harmful or 
offensive bodily contact with the plaintiff, the plaintiff does not consent to 
the contact, and harmful or offensive contact results.
2
  The defendant need 
not intend the particular type of harm that results.
3
  For instance, the 
                                                          
 2.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 52–53 (West Group 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (“[Harmful Contact:] An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if 
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third 
person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of 
the other directly or indirectly results.” (emphasis added)); Id. § 18(1) (“[Offensive Contact:] (1) An 
actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or 
offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such 
a contact, and (b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 3.  Jurisdictions differ as to whether the intent required for battery requires “dual intent,” that 
defendant intended to cause bodily contact and intended that the contact be harmful or offensive, or 
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defendant is liable for battery even if he intends only an offensive contact 
but a harmful contact results.
4
  Battery can also occur when the defendant 




The tort of battery is recognized as primarily protecting two interests: an 
interest in physical integrity, i.e., freedom from harmful bodily contact, and 
a dignitary interest, i.e., freedom from offensive bodily contact.
6
  Offending 
“a reasonable sense of personal dignity” means that the contact “would 
offend the ordinary person” and would be “unwarranted by the social usages 
prevalent at the time and place at which it is inflicted.”
7
 
In the context of domestic violence, abuse often violates one or both of 
these protected interests.  Physical abuse violates the victim’s interest in her 
own physical integrity and the victim’s inherent right to be free from 
physical harm.
8
  Physical violence, including any aggressive touching, by 
the abuser also violates the victim’s dignitary interest.  Protection from 
unwanted or offensive contact is an integral goal of the law of battery.
9
  
Domestic violence victims share this same protection offered to other tort 
victims, but abusive physical contact is particularly offensive in domestic 
                                                          
“single intent,” that defendant intended a bodily contact that turned out to be harmful or offensive.  
DOBBS, supra note 2, 58–59.  Compare White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 815 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) 
(requiring dual intent), with Villa v. Derouen, 614 So. 2d 714, 717 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (requiring 
single intent).  The Restatement (Third) of Torts failed to address or resolve this issue. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 1 (2010) (“A person acts 
with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing that 
consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result.”).  
Joseph H. King, The Torts Restatement’s Inchoate Definition of Intent for Battery, and Reflections 
on the Province of Restatements, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 623 (2011).  King provides: “[The § 1] definition 
is an umbrella one, providing an all-inclusive definition of what it means to ‘intend’ something. It 
simply defines the state of mind needed to support a finding that a defendant intended ‘something’ as 
a ‘consequence.’ But, before a person may be determined to have entertained the necessary intent for 
a specific tort, we have to also know what ‘consequence’ must have been intended for that tort. The 
Section 1 definition does not address that aspect of intent—the nature of the ‘consequence’ that must 
have been intended to support various traditional torts that require intent, such as battery.”  Id. at 
624. See also Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and 
Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1595–96 (2012) (discussing “how a Third Restatement might 
best formulate intentional tort doctrine in cases involving either harmful or offensive battery,” 
specifically intent requirements, given the “ambiguity of the relevant Second Restatement 
provisions”). 
 4.  See DOBBS, supra note 2, 58–59. 
 5.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965). 
 6.  DOMINICK R. VETRI, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 643 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2011). 
 7.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a (1965).  
 8.  DOBBS, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that battery “vindicates the plaintiff’s rights of 
autonomy”). 
 9.  Id. 
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violence situations because it violates the trust that should be present in an 
intimate partner relationship and is generally part of a pattern of abuse that is 
aimed at subordinating and controlling the victim. 
Common acts of domestic violence that constitute battery include: 
slapping, punching, kicking, choking, pushing, twisting and breaking limbs, 
burning, stabbing, mutilation, throwing the victim, or throwing objects at the 
victim.
10
  Abusers may push the victim down the stairs, out of a moving car, 
or against a wall, causing serious injury.
11
  Domestic violence perpetrators 
frequently use extreme violence against their partners, including extensive 
beatings, torture, and using weapons, such as knives and guns, to inflict 
serious injury or disfigurement and possibly even death.
12
 
Sexual battery is also extremely common in domestic violence 
relationships.
13
  Domestic violence perpetrators engage in a wide range of 
behaviors that constitute actionable sexual battery.  An abuser may 
physically force an intimate partner to have sex against her will.  He may 
coerce her to have sexual relations through threats of additional violence or 
force her to have sex after being beaten or in front of her children.
14
  He may 
also force her to perform sex acts she does not want to perform, including 
oral or anal sex, sex with third parties, and sex with objects.  He may also 
refuse to allow the victim to use contraception to protect against pregnancy 
and sexually transmitted diseases.
15
  Many states have statutory causes of 
action for rape and sexual battery.
16
  In the absence of a specific statute, a 
domestic violence plaintiff can file a common law claim for battery or 
sexual battery. 
2.  Assault 
Many domestic violence plaintiffs also will be able to file claims for 
                                                          
 10.  LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 79 (1979); see generally id. at 78–106 
(noting types of physical assaults the women studied experienced and detailing some of their 
stories). 
 11.  Anne L. Ganley, Understanding Domestic Violence: Preparatory Reading for Participants, 
in SUSAN SCHECHTER & ANNE L. GANLEY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A NATIONAL CURRICULUM FOR 
FAMILY PRESERVATION PRACTITIONERS 7, 12 (Janet Carter ed., 1995). 
 12.  EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 242 
(2007); Ganley, supra note 11, at 12. 
 13.  See generally WALKER, supra note 10, at 107–126 (discussing sexual abuse in violent 
relationships and providing personal accounts of women who experienced sexual abuse). 
 14.  Ganley, supra note 11, at 12. 
 15.  Sara L. Ainsworth, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 303, 326 (2013). 
 16.  VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION § 17:11 (David Frazee et al. eds., 
1998).  
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assault.  An assault occurs when the defendant acts intending to cause a 
harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff or acts intending to cause an 
imminent apprehension of such a contact, and the plaintiff is put in imminent 
apprehension of a harmful or an offensive contact.
17
  Some courts require 
that this apprehension of a contact be reasonable, as opposed to allowing for 
a claim based on actual apprehension.
18
  Threats by words alone are 
insufficient to sustain a claim for assault “unless[,] together with other acts 
or circumstances[, the threats] put the [plaintiff] in reasonable apprehension 
of an imminent harmful or offensive contact. . . .”
19
 
Assault is extremely common in abusive relationships.  Abusers seek to 
control their partners through threats of violence and intimidation.  In one 
study conducted in Pittsburgh, 97% of the participants reported that they had 
been threatened by their abusive spouses.
20
  Sixty-one percent of these 
victims indicated that they had been threatened “often.”
21
  Abusers 
commonly make verbal threats, threatening to kill the intimate partner and 
also often threatening to commit suicide after doing so.  Threats are also 
made through conduct, such as displaying weapons, stalking, driving 




The conduct that incites imminent apprehension for assault in the 
domestic violence context can be subtle yet especially powerful for a 
particular victim given the ongoing power, control, and abusiveness of the 
relationship.  Prior abuse creates a context for the victim’s understanding of 
the meaning of the abuser’s conduct.  Yelling or threatening can more 
readily signify a true threat of harmful or offensive contact when the 
perpetrator has previously engaged in abusive behavior.
23
  Once a 
perpetrator has used violence either with that victim or another victim from a 
prior relationship, a threat of violence becomes much more actual and 
imminent. 
                                                          
 17.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1) (1965) (“(1) An actor is subject to liability to 
another for assault if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of 
the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is 
thereby put in such imminent apprehension.”). 
 18.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 44 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).  
 19.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 31 (1965). 
 20.  MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, 
VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 26 (2008).  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Ganley, supra note 11, at 12. 
 23.  See MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN: A MODEL 
FOR ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 18 (1992).   
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3.  False Imprisonment 
Many domestic violence victims will have claims for false 
imprisonment.  False imprisonment occurs when a defendant acts intending 
to confine the plaintiff within boundaries fixed by the defendant, the 
defendant’s act directly or indirectly results in confinement of the plaintiff, 
and the plaintiff is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
24
  
Confinement for false imprisonment purposes may be achieved by physical 
force, threats of physical force, or other duress.
25
 
False imprisonment is common in domestic violence situations.  The 
acts constituting false imprisonment include locking the victim in a closet, 
room, or the home; forcing her to sit in a car, on the floor, or in one location 
for hours; prohibiting the victim from leaving the home; or refusing to give 
the victim keys to the home so that she is either automatically locked out if 
she leaves or is restricted from leaving without the ability to lock the door.
26
  
Victims may also be able to establish a claim for false imprisonment based 
on an abuser’s conduct during extended and ongoing sessions of abuse.  It is 
not uncommon for physical attacks to continue for hours or days, with the 
abuser sometimes taking breaks to rest, sleep, or drink alcohol.
27
  In these 
circumstances, the victim is confined by the abuser’s threat—already 
realized—of continued violence. 
4.  Stalking 
Stalking is also a recognized civil claim in some jurisdictions.  Often 
codified, many civil stalking provisions were enacted in response to 
celebrity stalking.
28
  These statutes, as well as common law claims for 
                                                          
 24.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965).  See also id. § 36 (1965) (“(1) To make 
the actor liable for false imprisonment, the other’s confinement within the boundaries fixed by the 
actor must be complete.  (2) The confinement is complete although there is a reasonable means of 
escape, unless the other knows of it.  (3) The actor does not become liable for false imprisonment by 
intentionally preventing another from going in a particular direction in which he has a right or 
privilege to go.”). 
 25.  Id. § 39 (1965) (“The confinement may be by overpowering physical force, or by 
submission to physical force.”); id. § 40 (1965) (“The confinement may be by submission to a threat 
to apply physical force to the other’s person immediately upon the other’s going or attempting to go 
beyond the area in which the actor intends to confine him.”); id. § 40A (1965) (“The confinement 
may be by submission to duress other than threats of physical force, where such duress is sufficient 
to make the consent given ineffective to bar the action.”).  Confinement may also be achieved 
through asserted legal authority.  Id. § 41 (1965). 
 26.  STARK, supra note 12, at 208. 
 27.  Id. at 246. 
 28.  1 THOMSON/WEST, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE, 
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stalking, are particularly helpful to domestic violence victims given the 
prevalence of stalking in abusive relationships.  Stalking is second only to 
assault in abusive acts utilized by domestic violence perpetrators.
29
  
Behaviors constituting stalking include: following the victim, maintaining 




5.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Other Claims 
Domestic violence plaintiffs often also have viable claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (IIED).  A defendant is liable under IIED for 
emotional distress and any resulting bodily harm when he “intentionally or 
recklessly causes severe emotional harm” to the plaintiff through “extreme 
and outrageous conduct.”
31
  Extreme and outrageous conduct is generally 
considered “conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent 
society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, 
mental distress of a very serious kind.”
32
 
In the domestic violence context, most successful IIED claims have 
been brought by plaintiffs who were threatened with or subjected to physical 
abuse.
33
  These cases have generally involved intolerable or atrocious 
conduct that was intended to cause severe emotional harm to the plaintiff.
34
  
Some courts have been reluctant to allow IIED claims against a spouse.
35
  
IIED claims and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, discussed 
below, recognize stand-alone emotional harm in which the plaintiff can 
recover for emotional harm without needing to prove physical injury.
36
 
Other possible intentional tort claims in the domestic violence context 






  Domestic 
                                                          
REVISED EDITION 135 (2005). 
 29.  STARK, supra note 12, at 256. 
 30.  VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:13.  
 31.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 
(2012).   
 32.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 60 (citations omitted). 
 33.  1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 117. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See infra Part III.B. 
 36.  See infra notes 64–65.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 
§ 45 cmt. a (2012) (“Emotional harm encompasses a variety of mental states, including fright, fear, 
sadness, sorrow, despondency, anxiety, humiliation, depression (and other mental illnesses), and a 
host of other detrimental—from mildly unpleasant to disabling—mental conditions.”).   
 37.  VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:15. 
 38.  1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 143–46.  
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violence plaintiffs may have viable claims for tortious infliction of a 
venereal disease.
40
  They may be able to seek damages for interference with 
educational opportunity
41
 or interference with custodial or visitation rights.
42
  
Victims may have valid claims for economic torts such as interference with 
contractual relations if the abuser controlled the victim’s access to money or 
otherwise prevented the victim from obtaining financial independence.
43
  





 if the abuser broke or sold the victim’s property.
46
  The 
intentional torts listed here are by no means exhaustive.  If a victim dies as a 
result of intentional or negligent acts by an abuser, surviving family 
members of a victim might have a claim for wrongful death.
47
  The victim’s 
estate may also be able to continue any cause of action the victim had 
against the abuser as a survival action.
48
 
6.  Intent for Intentional Torts and Recklessness and Negligence Claims 
With the exception of some wrongful death or survival actions, all of the 
aforementioned causes of action are intentional torts.  Intentional torts 
require intent, which occurs when a tortfeasor purposely acts to accomplish 
a certain result, or, though not acting with a specific purpose, knows with a 
substantial certainty that his or her actions will bring about a certain result.
49
  
Most acts of domestic violence involve sufficient intent to support an 
                                                          
 39.  VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:12. 
 40.  See 1 Kan. Law & Prac., Family Law § 8:32.4 (discussing tortious infliction of venereal 
disease in Kansas). 
 41.  VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:21. 
 42.  Id.; William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Legal or Natural Parent, or One Who 
Aids and Abets, for Damages Resulting from Abduction of Own Child, 49 A.L.R.4th 7 (1986); Joy 
M. Feinberg & Lori S. Loeb, Custody and Visitation Interference: Alternative Remedies, 12 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 271 (1994); William L. Hill, Note, Tort Recovery for Intentional Interference 
with Visitation Rights: A Necessary Alternative, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 657 (1994); Joseph R. 
Hillebrand, Note, Parental Kidnapping and the Tort of Custodial Interference: Not in a Child’s Best 
Interests, 25 IND. L. REV. 893, 906–13 (1991). 
 43.  Steven M. Pincus & David N. Rosen, Fighting Back: Filing Suit Under the Violence 
Against Women Act, TRIAL, Dec. 1997, at 21, 24. 
 44.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 222A, 229 (1965). 
 45.  See generally id. § 217 (1965). 
 46.  Pincus & Rosen, supra note 43, at 24. 
 47.  See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 803–05, 807–15.   
 48.  Id. at 805–07.   
 49.  Id. at 48; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 1 (2010) (“A person 
acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing 
that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to 
result.”). 
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intentional tort claim.  Abusers act deliberately and intentionally, opening 
the way for victims to file intentional tort claims, as opposed to negligence 
actions.  Domestic violence perpetrators use intentional acts to exert power 
over their partners.
50
  Their acts are intended “to punish, hurt, or control” 
their intimate partner.
51
  Their conduct is purposeful, seeking the compliance 
and control of the partner.
52
  Abusers have active control of their behavior 
and remain mindful and aware of their decisions even while committing 
violence.
53
  For each incident of abuse, domestic violence perpetrators give 
themselves permission to become abusive and choose how far to let 
themselves go.
54
  A true loss of control likely would result in much greater 
injury, even death, for the victim.
55
  An abuser’s decision to use violence 
against the intimate partner is a choice.  When abusers are in conflict with 
others—like co-workers or other family members—they do not choose to 
use violence against those individuals.
56
 
Abusers are calculated in choosing to abuse, and often incorporate 
family privacy into their decisions.  The private, isolated nature of the family 
provides increased opportunities for abuse that can play into this 
calculation.
57
  There is reduced social control in the private sphere of the 
family, and the cost to the perpetrator for abuse to an intimate partner is 
often significantly less than the cost of violence to someone outside the 
private sphere.
58
  The perpetrator may also decide that the rewards of 
abusing a partner are greater than the potential costs.
59
  Tort law assumes 
that individuals “stand back and consider the purposes they are attempting to 
realize through their acts, compare them with other possible purposes, and 
modify or abandon them.”
60
  Abusers engage in such contemplation. 
These calculations on the part of an abuser constitute sufficient 
culpability for intentional torts but also support torts requiring less 
                                                          
 50.  JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 13–17. 
 51.  STARK, supra note 12, at 205. 
 52.  Ganley, supra note 11, at 17–18. 
 53.  LUNDY BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE DO THAT?: INSIDE THE MINDS OF ANGRY AND 
CONTROLLING MEN 34–37 (2003). 
 54.  Id. at 339. 
 55.  Richard J. Gelles, An Exchange/Social Control Theory, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: 
CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 151, 159 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983).  
 56.  Ganley, supra note 11, at 23. 
 57.  See generally Gelles, supra note 55, at 151–65 (discussing the social costs of violence to 
the abuser in the family as opposed to in public). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 516 (1989). 
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  Claims for recklessness 
(sometimes referred to as willful or wanton conduct) arise out of the types of 
violence discussed above, usually within the context of battery.  Pursuing 
claims with lower levels of culpability may allow a plaintiff’s case to 
proceed if the court fails to find the intent required for intentional torts.  
Additionally, pleading a case for negligence may also offer the plaintiff a 
better chance of recovery.  While intentional tort actions usually are not 
covered by insurance policies, negligence actions typically are.
63
 
Domestic violence victims may also be able to file claims for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress (NIED).  NIED claims are primarily allowed 
in two situations: when an individual suffers emotional distress as a result of 
fearing for her own safety,
64
 and when an individual suffers emotional 
distress as a result of witnessing the serious bodily injury of a close family 
member.
65
  In domestic violence situations, liability for NIED for fearing for 
                                                          
 61.  A claim for recklessness requires a showing that the defendant engaged in conduct that 
created an unreasonable risk of harm to others and a high degree of risk or a risk of very serious 
harm. RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 2 (2010).  The defendant must have 
been conscious of the risk and engaged in the conduct without concern for the safety of others.  
DOBBS, supra note 2, at 51.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 2 (2010) 
(“A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if: (a) the person knows of the risk of harm created 
by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to another in the person’s situation, and (b) 
the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens that are so slight relative to 
the magnitude of the risk as to render the person’s failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of 
the person’s indifference to the risk.”). 
 62.  Concurrently pursuing a lesser-included claim of negligence may allow for recovery if the 
court finds that the abuser’s conduct was not intentional or reckless.  To make a claim for 
negligence, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) 
that the defendant breached that duty through his unreasonable and risky conduct; (3) that the 
defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s harms; (4) that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s harm, meaning there’s a significant relationship between the conduct and the 
harm; and, (5) that the plaintiff suffered legally recognized harm.  DOBBS, supra note 2, at 269.  C.f., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (2010) (“A person acts negligently if 
the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances.  Primary factors to consider 
in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that 
the person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and 
the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”).   
 63.  See infra part III.B.5. 
 64.  This claim applies when the defendant’s negligent conduct places the plaintiff in danger of 
immediate bodily harm and the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of that danger.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 47 (2012) (“An actor whose negligent 
conduct causes serious emotional harm to another is subject to liability to the other if the conduct: 
(a) places the other in danger of immediate bodily harm and the emotional harm results from the 
danger. . . .”). 
 65.  This claim, usually referred to as “bystander liability,” provides a cause of action when an 
individual suffers serious emotional harm as a result of contemporaneously perceiving an event 
caused by the negligence of the actor which results in sudden serious bodily injury to a close family 
member.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 48 (2012) (“An actor who 
negligently causes sudden serious bodily injury to a third person is subject to liability for serious 
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one’s own safety arises frequently.  NIED claims are viable only if the 
injuries are solely emotional.  If there are physical injuries, the proper tort is 
battery, and emotional harm would be compensated as pain and suffering. 
While beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that children 
may be able to pursue tort actions arising from domestic violence incidents.  
If a child is abused, the child may be able to file the same or similar common 
law claims as those available to domestic violence victims.  Children who 
are not directly abused but who live in homes where domestic violence is 
present may also be able to pursue tort actions.  If they witness abuse against 
a parent, they could file a negligence, reckless, or IIED claim.
66
  If they are 
injured accidentally incident to an act of domestic violence, they may be 
able to pursue negligence, recklessness, or intentional tort claims.
67
  
However, many jurisdictions still maintain parental immunity for tort suits 
filed by a child against a parent.
68
 
7.  Claims Against Third Parties 
It is also important to mention the possibility of filing domestic 
violence-related tort claims against third parties.  Claims are sometimes 
available against municipalities and law enforcement agencies for failing to 
respond to a report of a restraining order violation or an incident of 
violence.
69
  Tort liability may also arise for third parties who have a “special 
relationship” that gives rise to a duty.  The special relationship and its 
attendant duty can apply to doctors,
70
 therapists, and clergy members who 
                                                          
emotional harm caused thereby to a person who: (a) perceives the event contemporaneously, and (b) 
is a close family member of the person suffering the bodily injury.”).  Negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims also arise in the “direct victim” context, usually arising from specific 
activities, such as mishandling human remains, or a special relationship between the parties, such as 
that between a physician and patient in limited scenarios.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 47 cmt. b (2012) (noting that there can be liability “when an actor 
undertakes to perform specified obligations, engages in specified activities, or is in a specified 
relationship fraught with the risk of emotional harm”).  A third type of NIED claim arises under a 
direct victim theory under assumed or independent duty.  See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 848–51.   
 66.  Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and 
Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 340 (1997). 
 67.  Id. at 340–41. 
 68.  Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child 
Caused by Parent’s Negligence—Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4th 1066, § 3 (1981). 
 69.  See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:18; 2 
THOMSON/WEST, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE 26 
(Revised ed. 2005). 
 70.  See James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses’ Damage Actions Against Non-Reporting 
Physicians, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 191 (1996); James T.R. Jones, Kentucky Tort Liability for Failure to 
Report Family Violence, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 43 (1999). 
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may have a duty to third parties, here domestic violence victims.
71
  Tort 
claims also may be pursued against owners and occupiers of land who fail to 
protect against the criminal acts of third parties.  For instance, landlords may 
be liable for domestic violence torts occurring on rental property.
72
  In 
addition to suing abusers, victims can also bring suit against third parties for 
failure to provide reasonable care to protect them from the foreseeable 
criminal acts of an abuser.
73
  This has the potential to enhance the victim’s 
recovery and encourage third parties to protect victims from harm when they 
are able to do so. 
B.  Violence Against Women Act 
Congress acknowledged the importance of tort claims to domestic 
violence victims when it passed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 
(VAWA).
74
  VAWA created a federal civil rights cause of action for the 
broader category of gender-motivated violence, which included domestic 
violence.  This provision of VAWA, or Section 13981, framed the new 
claim as protecting the civil rights of victims
75
 by protecting the right of all 
people to be free of violent crimes motivated by gender.
76
  To assert a claim 
under VAWA, a plaintiff had to show that she was a victim of a “crime of 
violence motivated by gender.”
77
  VAWA defined a “crime of violence” as 
conduct that would constitute a felony against a person or would constitute a 
felony against property if the conduct against the property presented a 
serious risk of physical injury to another person and meets the definition of 
certain state or federal offenses.
78
  To satisfy the requirement that the crime 
was motivated by gender, the plaintiff would have to show that the crime 
was committed “because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at 
                                                          
 71.  See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:18; 2 
THOMSON/WEST, supra note 69, at 26–37. 
 72.  Tracy A. Bateman & Susan Thomas, Annotation, Landlord’s Liability for Failure to 
Protect Tenant from Criminal Acts of Third Person, 43 A.L.R.5th 207, § 4(a)–(e) (1996); Corey 
Mostafa, Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability, Foreseeability, and Landlord Liability 
for Third-Party Criminal Acts Against Tenants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 971 (2007); PREMISES LIABILITY 
3d § 41:19 (Louis Lehr ed. 2011).  
 73.  See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:19 (providing 
that “premises liability cases involving violence against women are based on claims of negligent 
security or dangerous conditions of the premises”). 
 74.  Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1796  
(codified as amended in various sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C. (1994)). 
 75.  Id. § 40302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)). 
 76.  42 U.S.C. § 13981(b). 
 77.  § 13981(c) & (d)(1). 
 78.  § 13981(d)(2)(A). 
  
708 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender. . . .”
79
  Successful 
plaintiffs could obtain compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and 
declaratory relief, and other relief deemed appropriate by the court presiding 
over the immediate case.
80
 
The civil remedy was framed as a civil right for women, allowing 
women to vindicate their right to be free from gender-motivated violence.
81
  
It was unclear when VAWA passed whether courts would interpret all 
domestic violence as a “crime of violence motivated by gender” and how 
courts would interpret which acts of domestic violence would constitute a 
violent act “because of gender or on the basis of gender” and “due, at least in 
part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.”
82
  While the VAWA civil 
rights claim was in effect, the majority of plaintiffs brought intentional tort 
claims with the civil rights claim.
83
  Court decisions on Section 13981 
domestic violence claims that followed VAWA’s passage affirmed that 
domestic violence cases could fall within the parameters of Section 13981.
84
 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court struck down the civil rights remedy 
created by VAWA in 2000 in United States v. Morrison.
85
  The Morrison 
Court held that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to 
enact the Section 13981 civil remedy.
86
  It found that gender-motivated 
violent conduct was noneconomic activity and that Congress’s attempt to 
regulate that conduct could not sustain a Constitutional challenge based on 
the aggregate effect of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce.
87
  
The Court also found that the civil rights remedy could not be upheld on 
Equal Protection grounds under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
88
  
                                                          
 79.  § 13981(d)(1). 
 80.  § 13981(c). 
 81.  S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 44 (1993); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385–86 (1994). 
 82.  Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE 
L.J. 2117, 2199–201 (1996). 
 83.  Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 132 n.57 (2001) 
[hereinafter Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts] (reviewing the seventy-three reported VAWA 
decisions and finding that fifty-one of the decisions included an intentional tort claim).  
 84.  Julie Goldscheid & Risa E. Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-Based Biascrimes—
Charting New Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 265, 273–83 (2001) 
(analyzing cases that interpreted when an act of violence was “gender-motivated” rather than 
“random”).  See, e.g., Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Seaton v. Seaton, 
971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).  See also Julie 
Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights 
Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 123, 145–58 (1999).   
 85.  529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 86.  Id. at 613. 
 87.  Id. at 613, 617–19. 
 88.  Id. at 619–27. 
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The Court rejected the argument that Congress could enact a private civil 
rights claim to remedy states’ pervasive bias against victims of gender-
motivated violence in state justice systems.
89
  The Court held that 
Congress’s power under Section 5 to enact legislation to guarantee that no 
state shall deprive any person of “life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law,” nor deny any person “equal protection of the laws,” did not 
empower it to create a Section 13981 claim against a private individual, as 
the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action, and not to “merely 
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”
90
 
C.  State and Local Claims for Domestic and Gender-Motivated Violence 
While still extremely rare, several states and one municipality have 
developed specific tort claims that apply to domestic violence victims, either 
statutorily or through common law.  Some of these claims mirror the now 
extinct VAWA civil remedy.  New Jersey and Washington recognize the tort 
of battered women’s syndrome; New York City, Illinois, and California 
acknowledge gender-motivated violence claims; and California has enacted 
a specific tort of domestic violence.  Each is addressed in turn.  While not 
specifically discussed here, it is important to note that many jurisdictions 




1.  New Jersey 
A New Jersey trial court allowed recovery under a novel civil domestic 
violence claim called “battered woman’s syndrome.”  In Cusseaux v. 
Pickett,
92
 the plaintiff, Jean Marie Cusseaux, brought a civil tort claim for 
“battered-woman’s syndrome” against her intimate partner, Wilson Pickett, 
Jr., with whom she had lived for about ten years.
93
  The plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant engaged in a continuous course of abuse and violence, 
including hitting her with his fists on repeated occasions, breaking her nose, 
hitting her with a heavy kitchen pot, and striking her with a large 
                                                          
 89.  Id. at 625–27. 
 90.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, §§ 1, 5; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). 
 91.  See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/10 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.79 
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-113 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21 (West 2013); 
D.C. CODE § 22-3704 (2013). 
 92.  652 A.2d 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995). 
 93.  Id. at 789. 
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corningware dish.
94
  The Cusseaux court held that the plaintiff had a 
cognizable claim for battered-woman’s syndrome and in doing so, created a 
unique domestic violence tort claim in the State of New Jersey.
95
  The court 
established that the elements of such a claim are: 
1) involvement in a marital or marital-like relationship; and 2) physical 
or psychological abuse perpetrated by the dominant partner . . . over an 
extended period of time; and 3) the aforestated abuse has caused 
recurring physical or psychological injury over the course of the 
relationship; and 4) a past or present inability [on the part of the victim] 
to take any action to improve or alter the situation unilaterally.
96
 
The court used many of the arguments related to the use of battered 
women’s syndrome as a defense in criminal cases
97
 in allowing a similarly 
named affirmative civil cause of action.
98
  Battered woman’s syndrome as an 
affirmative tort claim was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New 
Jersey Superior Court in the case of Giovine v. Giovine.
99
 
2.  Washington 
Washington State also acknowledges a tort called “battered woman 
syndrome.”  A Washington State Superior Court allowed recovery in a 
“battered woman syndrome” case.
100
  In Jewett v. Jewett, the plaintiff 
Theresa Jewett filed an action for assault, battery, battered woman 
syndrome, IIED, and outrage—as well as claims for deceit/bigamy, 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract of marriage, abuse of civil 
legal process, and wrongful initiation of civil proceedings.
101
  Jewett alleged 
that the defendant Michael Jewett engaged in a calculated pattern of 
pervasive and ongoing severe emotional and physical abuse after the parties’ 
                                                          
 94.  Id. at 789–90 n.1.  
 95.  Id. at 793. 
 96.  Id. at 793–94.   
 97.  See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1984) (discussing battered women’s 
syndrome as grounds for a self defense claim in a homicide case). 
 98.  Cusseaux, 652 A.2d at 791–92, 794.   
 99.  663 A.2d 109, 114, 123–24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (affirming the elements of 
battered woman’s syndrome enumerated in Cusseaux v. Pickett but clarifying that underlying 
abusive acts in a battered woman’s syndrome claim must fall within the standard statute of 
limitations), overruled on other grounds by Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1997). 
 100.  Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1993).  
 101.  Verified Complaint For Damages at 7–10, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1993); First Amended Complaint For Damages at 7–12, Jewett v. Jewett, 
No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1993); Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint 
For Damages at 7–13, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1994). 
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marriage.
102
  On one occasion, in retaliation for the plaintiff calling the 
police, the defendant hyperextended the plaintiff’s head, resulting in 
permanent neck and upper back damage.
103
  On another occasion, the 
defendant threw the plaintiff down against a coffee table and then repeatedly 
hit her in the face until she lost consciousness.
104
  The injuries were so 
severe that the plaintiff required reconstructive surgery to reposition her 
cheekbone.
105
  These are just a few of the violent episodes set forth in the 
plaintiff’s complaint. 
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
battered woman syndrome claim.
106
  The court took judicial notice of the 
“extreme form of dependence” that many domestic violence victims 
experience.
107
  It noted:  
[The parties’] interaction encourages not only the continuance of the 
relationship but also the violence within it.  Once caught in the cycle, 
traditional remedies under the law, including the right to file civil 
actions for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (outrage), for all practical purposes are not available because 




The court articulated the elements of this new tort of battered woman 
syndrome as follows: 
(1) a pattern of volitional acts, which include physical acts and 
gestures, as well as statements, threats, or verbal utterances; (2) which 
is reasonably calculated to create fear or anxiety or to establish 
perceptions of fear or anxiety for the victim’s self or family; (3) that is 
continuous in nature, and, occurs over a period of time; (4) that could 
reasonably have been foreseen to, and that in fact did cause; (5) 
physical injury, emotional distress, or a state of emotional dependency 
that renders a victim unable to effectively maintain an action against 
                                                          
 102.  Verified Complaint For Damages at 2, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. 
Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1994). 
 103.  Id. at 2–3. 
 104.  Id. at 4. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Battered Women’s Syndrome 
Pursuant to CR 12(b)(6) at 4, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 
1994). 
 107.  Id. at 1. 
 108.  Id. 
  




The plaintiff Theresa Jewett was granted a default judgment on her 
claims, including the battered woman syndrome claim.
110
  She was awarded 
$127,316 in damages through a stipulated judgment.
111
  The judgment was 
paid by the defendant’s estate because the defendant died of a heart attack in 
Costa Rica during the pendency of litigation.
112
 
D.  City and State Statutory Developments 
The Jewett court’s decision to recognize this novel claim was, as in the 
New Jersey case of Cusseaux v. Pickett, a progressive and important step in 
the development of domestic violence tort law.  Other jurisdictions have 
taken a different approach by creating gender-motivated violence claims, 
similar to the now defunct civil remedy provision of VAWA.  New York 
City, Illinois, and California have adopted gender-motivated violence laws 
that cover but are not limited to injuries arising from domestic violence. 
1.  New York City 
New York City enacted a provision addressing domestic violence 
entitled the Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act.
113
  The 
provision, contained in the Civil Rights section of the Administrative Code, 
provides a private right of action to victims of gender-motivated violence 
against their perpetrators.
114
  To succeed under such a claim, a victim must 
show that she was a victim of a “crime of violence” and that the crime of 
violence was “motivated by gender.”
115
  The code defines a “crime of 
                                                          
 109.  Id. at 3.  See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Spokane Legal Servs. at 19–20, Jewett v. Jewett, 
No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1994) (providing that the tort of “domestic 
violence,” i.e. battered women syndrome, is defined by these five elements).  
 110.  Stipulated Judgment on Default, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. 
Spokane Cnty. 1996).  The defendant’s motion to vacte the judgment was denied.  Order Denying 
Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Order and Judgment, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1996). 
 111.  Stipulated Judgment on Default at 2, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. 
Spokane Cnty. 1996). 
 112.  Jim Lynch, Woman Wins Abuse Lawsuit Jewett to Receive $125,000 from Dead Spouse’s 
Estate, THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW (Jan. 6, 1996), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1996/jan/06/woman-wins-abuse-lawsuit-jewett-to-receive-
125000/. 
 113.  NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 8-901 to 8-907 (2000). 
 114.  Id. § 8-902. 
 115.  Id. §§ 8-903, 904. 
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violence” as “an act or series of acts that would constitute a misdemeanor or 
felony against the person” or “against property as defined in state or federal 
law if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, 
whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, 
prosecution, or conviction.”
116
  The law defines “crime of violence 
motivated by gender” as “a crime of violence committed because of gender 
or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the 
victim’s gender.”
117
  Upon successfully showing these two elements, victims 
can seek “compensatory and punitive damages,” “injunctive and declaratory 




New York City’s Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act is not 
tailored to address intimate partner violence exclusively but certainly 
encompasses it.  Domestic violence cases fit squarely within the parameters 
set forth by New York City’s Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act.  
The law’s Declaration of Legislative Findings and Intent makes repeated 
reference to the findings and intent of Congress in passing the federal 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
119
 including Congress’s intention 
to aid domestic violence victims through VAWA’s federal civil remedy.  
The Committee Report supporting passage of the Act also makes repeated 
reference to domestic violence.
120
 
Before passing the bill, the New York City Council heard testimony 
positing that a claim for gender-motivated violence would provide a much-
needed remedy for domestic violence victims.  This testimony stated that 
“[c]urrently there are no legal remedies that provide meaningful economic 
relief to victims of gender-based domestic violence in New York City for the 
                                                          
 116.  Id. § 8-903. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. § 8-904. 
 119.  Id. § 8-902. 
 120.  COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE JOINTLY WITH THE COMM. ON WOMEN’S ISSUES, COMM. REP. 
ON PROPOSED INT. NO. 752-A (Nov. 30, 2000), available at 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=434516&GUID=CE9A1F14-B559-470A-
AB90-40FE9754385C (“The pervasiveness of domestic violence is well documented.  According to 
the Mayor’s Management Report for Fiscal 2000, the Police Department made 23,935 family-related 
arrests for the year and there were 4,012 arrests for violations of orders of protection.  Further, the 
police filed 252,902 domestic incident reports in fiscal 2000.  (Advocates believe that since many 
domestic violence incidents are not reported, this figure does not reflect the true immensity of the 
domestic violence problem in New York City).  During fiscal 1999, the Police Department reported 
87 domestic violence-related homicides.  However, as is noted in the legislative findings, various 
task forces and the United States Department of Justice have found a climate of hostility in court 
systems towards sexual assault and domestic violence claims.”).   
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injuries they incur as a result of domestic violence.”
121
  All voting members 
of the City Council unanimously passed the Act on December 5, 2000, and 
the mayor signed the law into effect on December 19, 2000.
122
 
The only published decision related to New York City’s Gender-
Motivated Violence Protection Act is Cadiz-Jones v. Zambetti,
123
 which is 
based on intimate partner violence.  In Cadiz-Jones, Ms. Cadiz-Jones sued 
her former fiancé Mr. Zambetti for physical abuse under a number of claims, 
including a gender-motivated violence claim under the Act.
124
  The main 
issue in the case was whether Ms. Cadiz-Jones’s gender-motivated violence 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations or whether it was still valid 
because the Act applied retroactively.
125
 
The Cadiz-Jones court clearly acknowledged that domestic violence fits 
within the cause of action provided by the Act.  The court did not address 
whether domestic violence constitutes gender-motivated violence.  Instead, 
it launched into the primary issues of the case, namely matters related to the 
statute of limitations and retroactivity.  In its decision, the Cadiz-Jones court 
stated, “It is evident that the City Council’s intent was to fill the gap as soon 
as Morrison was decided by restoring the availability of a private remedy for 
domestic violence victims in New York City. . . .”
126
  The court specified 
that the Act does not create a “distinct ‘tort of domestic violence.’”
127
 
2.  Illinois 
Illinois also provides an avenue for domestic violence tort relief through 
its Gender Violence Act.
128
  While not limited to domestic violence, the 
Gender Violence Act is sufficiently broad to encompass domestic violence 
as well as other forms of gender-motivated violence and was drafted with 
                                                          
 121.  Cadiz-Jones v. Zambretti, No. 123772/00, 2002 WL 34697795, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 9, 
2002). 
 122.  Cadiz-Jones, 2002 WL 34697795, at *7.  Nearby Westchester County quickly followed 
New York City’s lead when it established the Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act.  
WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY, LAWS OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY ch. 701 (2001).  Nearby Rockland 
County also followed suit.  ROCKLAND COUNTY, NY, LAWS OF ROCKLAND COUNTY ch. 279 (2001). 
 123.  Cadiz-Jones, 2002 WL 34697795.  But c.f. Cordero v. Epstein, 869 N.Y.S.2d 725, 730–31 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (dismissing a Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act claim for sexual 
contact with a minor because the statute of limitations had run and there was no showing that the 
defendant had “demonstrated any hostility based on gender”). 
 124.  Cadiz-Jones, 2002 WL 34697795, at *2–3. 
 125.  Id. at *3–8. 
 126.  Id. at *7. 
 127.  Id. at *8. 
 128.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82 / 1–20 (West 2013).   
  
2014] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS 715 
domestic violence in mind.  The Preamble to the Bill frames the proposed 
Act as one targeting domestic violence and sexual abuse.  It states that 
studies have shown that “gender-related violence such as domestic violence, 
which is disproportionately visited upon women by men, . . . [h]arms many 
women and children without being reported or prosecuted.”
129
 The Preamble 
goes on to say that “[i]t is documented that existing State and federal laws 
have not provided adequate remedies to women survivors of domestic 
violence.”
130
  Then it states that “[w]omen survivors of domestic violence 
oftentimes have found laws against domestic violence used against them by 
their batterers.”
131
  With the bill so explicitly couched in terms of domestic 
violence, the Illinois legislature clearly meant for the Act to provide an 
avenue of tort relief for domestic violence victims.  The Act states that 
gender-motivated violence, including domestic violence, is a form of sex 
discrimination that the Act seeks to remedy.
132
 
The Illinois Act ties its definition of gender-related violence to the 
state’s criminal definition of battery, defining “gender-related violence” as: 
(1) One or more acts of violence or physical aggression satisfying the 
elements of battery under the laws of Illinois that are committed, at 
least in part, on the basis of a person’s sex, whether or not those acts 
have resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction[; or] (2) 
[a] physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under 
coercive conditions satisfying the elements of battery under the laws of 
Illinois, whether or not the act or acts resulted in criminal charges, 
prosecution, or conviction[; or] (3) [a] threat of an act described in item 
(1) or (2) causing a realistic apprehension that the originator of the 
threat will commit the act.
133
 
The Illinois Gender Violence Act provides that victims of gender-
motivated violence may seek “injunctive relief, . . . actual damages, damages 
for emotional distress, or punitive damages,” as well as “attorney’s fees and 




California has established both a civil action for gender-motivated 
                                                          
 129.  2003 ILL. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-416 (West). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82 / 5 (West 2013). 
 134.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82 / 15 (West 2013). 
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violence and a specific domestic violence tort.
135
  The California gender-
motivated violence claim, known as the “[c]ivil action for damages arising 
from gender violence,” largely mirrors the requirements of the Illinois 
Gender Violence Act.
136
  The California domestic violence tort claim, 
known as the “tort of domestic violence,” provides civil relief specifically 
tailored to domestic violence as opposed to the broader category of gender 
violence.
137
  California Civil Code Section 1708.6 provides that a person is 
liable for the tort of domestic violence if “(1) [t]he infliction of injury upon 
the plaintiff result[s] from abuse,” and “(2) [t]he abuse was committed by . . 
. a person having a relationship with the plaintiff as defined” by the 
statute.
138
  “Abuse” as required in the first element includes “intentionally or 
recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another 
person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to 
himself or herself, or another.”
139
  The relationship required for tort liability 
can be that of a “spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or 
person with whom the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a 
dating or engagement relationship.”
140
 
Under the California statute, a domestic violence tort plaintiff may 
recover “general damages, special damages, and punitive damages.”
141
  In 
these cases, courts are also authorized to grant “equitable relief, an 
injunction, costs, and any other relief that the court deems proper, including 
                                                          
 135.  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 52.4, 1708.6 (West 2011). 
 136.  CIV. § 52.4.  Section 52.4 provides in relevant part: “(a) Any person who has been 
subjected to gender violence may bring a civil action for damages against any responsible party. The 
plaintiff may seek actual damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, any 
combination of those, or any other appropriate relief. A prevailing plaintiff may also be awarded 
attorney’s fees and costs.  (b) An action brought pursuant to this section shall be commenced within 
three years of the act, or if the victim was a minor when the act occurred, within eight years after the 
date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years after the date the plaintiff discovers 
or reasonably should have discovered the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of 
majority that was caused by the act, whichever date occurs later.  (c) For purposes of this section, 
“gender violence,” is a form of sex discrimination and means any of the following: (1) One or more 
acts that would constitute a criminal offense under state law that has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, committed at least 
in part based on the gender of the victim, whether or not those acts have resulted in criminal 
complaints, charges, prosecution, or conviction[; or] (2) A physical intrusion or physical invasion of 
a sexual nature under coercive conditions, whether or not those acts have resulted in criminal 
complaints, charges, prosecution, or conviction.”  Id. 
 137.  CIV. § 1708.6. 
 138.  CIV. § 1708.6(a). 
 139.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700(a) (West 2005). 
 140.  Id. § 13700(b). 
 141.  CIV. § 1708.6(b) 
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reasonable attorney’s fees.”
142
  The California legislature recognized the 
importance of tort recovery for domestic violence victims.  Its findings 
include that “[t]hese acts merit special consideration as torts, because the 
elements of trust, physical proximity, and emotional intimacy necessary to 
domestic relationships in a healthy society makes participants in those 
relationships particularly vulnerable to physical attack by their partners.”
143
  
The California courts have supported domestic violence tort claims,
144
 and 




These state and local causes of action, which aim to provide meaningful 
civil remedies to domestic violence victims, are good foundational efforts in 
the area of domestic violence torts.  While this paper argues for the use of 
existing tort remedies, domestic violence specific tort claims could provide 
victims with even greater recovery.
146
  Under such claims, courts could 
                                                          
 142.  CIV. § 1708.6(c). 
 143.  2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 193 § 1(b) (West).  The legislature also found that “acts of 
violence occurring in a domestic context [were] increasingly widespread,” and, “[t]he purpose of this 
act [was] to enhance the civil remedies available to victims of domestic violence in order to 
underscore society’s condemnation of these acts, to ensure complete recovery to victims, and to 
impose significant financial consequences upon perpetrators.”  Id. § 1(a), (c).   
 144.  See Cheng v. Casas, No. H034352, 2011 WL 882995 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2011) 
(unpublished decision) (affirming trial court’s order awarding terminating sanctions against plaintiff 
in action for tort of domestic violence and other claims for negligence and intentional torts arising 
from domestic violence); Boblitt v. Boblitt, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(reversing and remanding to allow plaintiff to proceed on her tort of domestic violence claim that 
was dismissed pursuant to a motion for summary judgment in a divorce proceeding); Pugliese v. 
Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 681 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that domestic violence 
plaintiffs, including tort of domestic violence plaintiffs, are entitled to seek recovery for all acts of 
domestic abuse occurring during the domestic relationship so long as the litigant proves a continuing 
course of abusive conduct); Deal v. Deal, No. A105221, 2005 WL 388725 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 
18, 2005) (unpublished decision) (finding that plaintiff’s child abduction allegations do not 
constitute a claim under the tort of domestic violence statute). 
 145.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.15 (West 2011). 
 146.  See generally Rhonda L. Kohler, The Battered Women and Tort Law: A New Approach to 
Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (1992) (arguing that “the courts and 
legislatures should recognize a new tort of spousal abuse which would facilitate compensating 
women for mental and physical injuries inflicted by battering domestic partners”).  Kohler offers 
guidance to courts and legislatures in creating and recognizing domestic violence tort claims, 
recommending that courts recognize a continuing tort of spousal abuse using the following elements: 
“(1) intentional acts; (2) of extreme and outrageous conduct; (3) of a continuous nature; (4) 
proximately causing; (5) physical injury or emotional distress.”  Id. at 1068.  See also Sarah M. Buel, 
Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic 
Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945, 1019–25 (2004) (arguing for recognition of a domestic 
violence tort and describing the benefits of a specially designated domestic violence tort); Dalton, 
supra note 66, at 344–46 (proposing a new tort of “partner abuse,” incorporating “the entire history 
of combined physical and emotional abuse [into] a single claim”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, 
Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2566–67 (1994) 
(proposing a new “claim for marital tort or breach of spousal trust,”  providing recovery for 
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compensate for emotional abuse that might not otherwise clearly be tortious 
and consider claims within the context of the emotional and physical abuse 
throughout the relationship.  Some statute of limitations issues also may be 
alleviated by specific domestic violence tort claims that allow courts to 
examine long histories of abuse.  States and municipalities should carefully 
craft statutes creating domestic violence tort causes of action, and courts 
should recognize common law claims for domestic violence similar to the 
battered woman’s syndrome claim acknowledged by the New Jersey and 
Washington courts.
147
  Lawyers and plaintiffs should continue to bring novel 
claims for domestic violence torts to move this area of law forward.
148
 
III. REASONS FOR AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SCARCITY OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORT CLAIMS 
A. Scarcity of Claims 
Domestic violence tort claims represent a negligible percentage of all 
legal actions.  Unfortunately there are no current studies as to the percentage 
of intentional tort cases involving intimate partners as opposing parties.  
Research results published in 1992 revealed a true dearth of intentional tort 
claims between intimate partners.
149
  Only fifty-three of 2600 state battery or 
assault cases that were reported between 1981 and 1990 were between adult 
parties in a domestic relationship.
150
  Just four such cases in federal court 
during the same time period were “between adult parties in a domestic 
relationship.”
151
  Only eighteen of more than 6,000 reported intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims in state and federal courts between 
                                                          
“physical, emotional, and economic injuries flowing from a spouse’s misconduct,” and 
acknowledging “a person’s right to be free from egregious conduct related to sex and gender and to 
abuse of power in the home”); Melissa J. Peña, Note, The Role of Appellate Courts in Domestic 
Violence Cases and the Prospect of a New Partner Abuse Cause of Action, 20 REV. LITIG. 503, 523–
26 (2001) (proposing that state appellate courts adopt a cause of action for “partner abuse” which 
would “permit the victim to recover for all injuries occurring [throughout] the battering 
relationship”).   
 147.  See generally Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 1539 (1997) (discussing the successful creation of new torts generally). 
 148.  See, e.g., Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 619 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (discussing 
whether the tort of domestic violence exists as a cause of action). 
 149.  Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543, 
565 & n.155 (1992) (“Among approximately 2600 reported state cases of battery, assault, or both, 
from 1981 through 1990, only fifty-three involved adult parties in domestic relationships.”). 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id. at 565. 
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1958 and 1990 were based on facts indicating domestic violence.
152
  This 
means that only 0.3% of all intentional infliction of emotional distress cases 
studied arose from domestic violence incidents.  In 2003, Professor Jennifer 
Wriggins conducted a Westlaw search attempting to quantify the number of 
domestic violence tort cases.
153
  Wriggins searched “in the Westlaw 
ALLCASES database for cases containing the words domestic violence and 
assault, battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
154
  Out of the 
6,138 citations she retrieved, only thirty-four cases involved intimate 
partners or former intimate partners in a domestic violence relationship.
155
  
Some of these cases were independent tort claims, and some were added as 
counterclaims in divorce actions.
156
  Wriggins also searched the Civil Justice 
database of the National Crime Victim Bar Association, “which includes 
over 11,000 cases,” and “found no domestic violence tort cases.”
157
  Given 
the prevalence of domestic violence, these statistics reveal that domestic 
violence tort remedies have been very rarely pursued. 
A look at historical developments in common law, combined with 
current policy restrictions in insurance coverage, reveals an environment 
inhospitable to domestic violence torts. 
                                                          
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence in the First-Year Torts Curriculum, 54 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 511, 512–13 (2004) [hereinafter Wriggins, First-Year Torts] (“Recent searches in the 
Westlaw ALLCASES database for cases containing the words domestic violence and assault, 
battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, retrieved a total of 6,138 citations, but only 34 
cases that contained tort claims arising from domestic violence in an intimate or formerly intimate 
relationship.”); Jennifer B.Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 139, 155 (2005) [hereinafter Wriggins, Feminist Revision of Torts]. 
 154.  Wriggins, First-Year Torts, supra note 153, at 512–13. 
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id. at 513 n.8.  Note eight provides: “Specifically, the search (July 30, 2003) for cases 
containing the words domestic violence and assault retrieved 4,408 citations, going back to 1961.  
Only 22 contained tort claims arising from domestic violence in an intimate or formerly intimate 
relationship.  The search (July 31, 2003) for cases containing the words domestic violence and 
battery retrieved 1,598 citations, 25 of which contained such tort claims.  Of those 25, 18 overlapped 
with cases retrieved with the domestic violence and assault search, so there was a total of 29 separate 
cases between the two searches.  Similarly, the search (June 12, 2003) for cases mentioning domestic 
violence and intentional infliction of emotional distress retrieved 132 cases going back to 1982, only 
13 of which dealt with the sort of claims I was seeking.  Eight of these overlapped with cases in the 
other categories; in other words, there were 5 cases that did not fall in another category.  Thus, the 
three searches turned up a total of 34 cases.  Some of the 34 cases dealt with tort claims brought as 
counterclaims in a divorce, and some dealt with tort claims independent of divorces.  The overall 
figure of 6,138 citations includes cases that appear in more than one category.  These searches 
revealed thousands of criminal prosecutions pertaining to domestic violence.”  Id.  
 157.  Id. at 513. 
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B. Chastisement, Coverture, Spousal Immunity, Courts, and Insurance 
Historical and current forces in common law and insurance have 
conspired to prevent the development of domestic violence tort law.  Under 
common law, the right of chastisement, the doctrine of coverture, spousal 
immunity, and courts’ underhanded refusal to acknowledge the abrogation 
of spousal immunity have barred domestic violence tort claims.  
Additionally, insurance companies’ current policy exclusions deny 
meaningful recovery to many domestic violence plaintiffs.  Each of these 
factors contributing to the dearth of domestic violence tort claims will be 
examined. 
1.  Chastisement 
Common law historically has fostered domestic violence.  Early 
common law shielded perpetrators of domestic violence from civil liability 
for their tortious acts, especially abuse perpetrated against spouses.  The 
doctrines of chastisement and coverture not only prevented women from 
pursuing civil claims against their husbands for abuse but also allowed and 
encouraged domestic violence in marriage.  Specifically, men could beat, 
rape, or otherwise harm their wives, and the law protected this conduct. 
The doctrine of chastisement granted men permission to engage in 
violent conduct toward their wives that today would constitute the 
underlying acts of domestic violence torts.  Chastisement specifically 
permitted husbands to physically discipline or provide “correction” to their 
wives.
158
  This was justified because: 
[A]s he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable 
to entrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic 
chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct 
his servants or children; for whom the master or parent is also liable in 
some cases to answer.
159
 
Under the right of chastisement, the husband could legally “chastise” his 
wife—or subject her to physical punishment—if she was not obedient to her 
husband or had otherwise engaged in “misbehavior.”
160
  The right of 
chastisement was limited to “reasonable bounds,” and husbands were 
                                                          
 158.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444 (1771). 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Siegel, supra note 82, at 2123; see generally id. at 2121–30 (detailing the right of 
chastisement). 
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allowed to use violence against their wives so long as the right to do so 
lawfully and reasonably belonged to the husband for the correction of his 
wife.
161
  The civil law permitted husbands the power to beat their wives 




In the United States, the right of chastisement stopped being recognized 
in the 1870s.
163
  Several cases explicitly rejected the right of chastisement.  
In 1871, the Alabama Supreme Court in Fulgham v. State rejected a 
husband’s right to chastise his wife.
164
  The Alabama court held that “the 
privilege . . . to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her 
face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not 
now acknowledged by our law.”
165
  The Massachusetts Supreme Court also 
rejected chastisement that same year in Commonwealth v. McAfee.
166
  In 
McAfee, the wife died as a result of severe domestic violence committed by 
her husband.
167
  The husband requested that the jury be instructed that he 
“had a legal right to administer due and proper correction and corporeal 
chastisement on his wife.”
168
  The judge refused to offer this instruction and 
instead instructed the jury that if the defendant’s “unlawful blows” caused 
the wife’s death, the jury should find the defendant guilty.
169
  The jury found 
the defendant guilty of manslaughter.
170
 
2.  Coverture 
The doctrine of coverture also has severely stunted the development of 
domestic violence tort law.  Coverture, rooted in the French covert-baron, 
meant that a married woman was “under the protection and influence of her 
husband, her baron, or lord.”
171
  Under the law of coverture, once married, a 
“husband and wife are one person in law,”
172
 as “the very being or legal 
                                                          
 161.  1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at 444 . 
 162.  Id. at 445. 
 163.  Siegel, supra note 82, at 2129; see generally id. at 2122–41 (providing an in-depth 
discussion of chastisement, including chastisement in the U.S.). 
 164.  Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871). 
 165.  Id. at 146–47. 
 166.  108 Mass. 458 (1871). 
 167.  Id. at 458–59. 
 168.  Id. at 459. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. at 460. 
 171.  1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at 442. 
 172.  Id.  See also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 433 
(“It being held that they are one person in law.”). 
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existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of husband, under whose wing, 
protection, and cover, she performs every thing [sic].”
173
  The unity of the 
two was almost total, and a husband could not convey any property to or 
enter into any contract with his wife, as this “would be to suppose her 
separate existence,” since “to covenant with her, would be only to covenant 
with himself.”
174
  A husband acquired the rights to and possession of a 
wife’s personal and real property under the notion of the unity of person 
between husband and wife.
175
 
The same concept of unity was applied to a wife’s ability to bring an 
independent personal injury action.  The law dictated that “[i]f the wife be 
injured in her person, or her property, she can bring no action for redress 
without her husband’s concurrence, and in his name, as well as her own.”
176
  
Similarly, a wife could not be independently sued.
177
  Under the doctrine of 
coverture, neither the husband nor the wife could maintain a tort action 
against the other.
178
  Historically, “at common law the husband and wife 
were one, and the husband was that one.”
179
  If a wife were to sue her 
husband for a domestic violence tort, the husband would have been joined as 
a plaintiff against himself and he would have received the recovery.
180
  
Thus, under coverture, husbands committing abusive acts were protected 
from civil liability. 
The common law principle of coverture made its way from England to 
early America, in large part through Blackstone’s Commentaries on English 
law.  Early American judges, lawyers, and lawmakers upheld the principle 
of unity under coverture as an ideal concept.
181
  American treatise writers 
“parroted” Blackstone, and coverture became the general rule.
182
 
                                                          
 173.  1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at 442.  
 174.  Id.  
 175.  2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 172, at 433–35. 
 176.  1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at 443. 
 177.  Id.   
 178.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 901–02. 
 179.  Id. at 902; WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 859–64 (4th ed. 1971). 
 180.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. b (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 
860. 
 181.  MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 14 (1986).   
 182.  HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 116–17 (2000).  See 
generally id. at 93–135 (discussing the law and tradition surrounding wives in early America); id. at 
11–23 (describing the great variation in early American law based on individual colony and state 
approaches to regulation of marriage). See also SALMON, supra note 181, at 14 (noting that 
coverture—i.e. “unity of person”—as advertised by Blackstone, though often revised, was never 
abandoned). 
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Coverture remained the norm until states began enacting Married 
Women’s Property Acts around 1844.
183
  These Acts, which were also called 
Married Women’s Acts or Emancipation Acts, were passed in all 
jurisdictions in the U.S.
184
  They were designed to provide married women 
with a separate legal identity and a right to hold their own property.
185
  
These statutes to some extent gave married women a legal identity separate 
from their husbands.  They permitted married women to sue and be sued 
without joining the husband as a party, to have separate ownership and 
control of their own property, and to be responsible for their own torts.
186
  
They permitted married women to “maintain an action in her own name, for 
damages, against any person . . . for any injury to her person or character, 
the same as if she were sole.”
187
 
Courts limited married women’s new rights to sue when it involved their 
husbands, however.  Under Married Women’s Property Acts, courts 
generally allowed wives to sue their husbands for torts arising from property 
interests.
188
  That is, a married woman could sue her husband for conversion, 
detention of chattels, fraud, trespass to land, waste, negligent damage to 
property, ejectment, or unlawful detainer.
189
  Most courts, however, refused 
to interpret the new Acts as allowing a married woman to sue her husband 
for torts arising from injury to the person.
190
  Instead, courts maintained de 
facto coverture for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, defamation, and negligence claims by married women against 
their husbands.
191
  Courts rejected these claims even if the tortious conduct 
occurred “before the marriage . . . or where the [suit] brought after the 




Courts developed new rationales for refusing to recognize claims,
193
 
                                                          
 183.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 902. 
 184.  PROSSER, supra note 179, at 861. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 902. 
 187.  Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 373 (1989) 
(quoting Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 642 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1865)) (based on an 1862 New 
York statute that was typical of most “Married Women” statutes at the time).   
 188.  PROSSER, supra note 179, at 861 (citations omitted).   
 189.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. c (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 861 
(citations omitted). 
 190.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. c (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 
861–62. 
 191.  PROSSER, supra note 179, at 862 (citations omitted).   
 192.  Id.  
 193.  See LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 77 (1969) 
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propounding a number of justifications for prohibiting suits between spouses 
for personal injury.
194
  A primary reason cited was that a tort suit would 
destroy the peace and harmony of the home and the marital relationship.
195
  
Courts also reasoned that the availability of these suits would induce spouses 
to file fraudulent claims.
196
  Another justification was that courts would be 
burdened by excessive or trivial claims.
197
 
3.  Spousal Immunity 
Thus, despite the Married Women’s Property Acts, coverture lived on in 
tort law as the common law doctrine of spousal immunity.
198
  Spousal 
immunity was first recognized in the U.S. in the 1860s, with courts 
unanimously upholding the doctrine until 1913.
199
  In 1910, a split U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed immunity between spouses for personal injury 
claims in Thompson v. Thompson.
200
  From 1914 to 1920, all but seven 
jurisdictions recognized spousal immunity.
201
 From 1921 to 1940, 
substantially more jurisdictions maintained spousal immunity than abrogated 
it.
202
  Spousal immunity slowly lost hold until 1970, after which it became a 
minority rule.
203
  The Restatement (Second) allowed for tort suits between 
spouses in 1979.
204
  By 1988, spousal tort immunity had been largely 
eliminated in most jurisdictions.
205
  In those states that have retained spousal 
immunity, many have identified certain types of actions to which spousal 




                                                          
(discussing rationales for interspousal tort immunity after the Married Women’s Property Acts). 
 194.  See generally Siegel, supra note 82, at 2161–70 (providing a discussion of the justifications 
offered by courts for maintaining spousal tort immunity). 
 195.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. d (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 122 
(citation omitted); Tobias, supra note 187, at 389 (citations omitted). 
 196.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. d (1979); KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, 
at 902 (citations omitted); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 863. 
 197.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. d (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 863 
(citations omitted); Tobias, supra note 187, at 390 (citations omitted). 
 198.  1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 283–84.  
 199.  Tobias, supra note 187, at 359, 383–98. 
 200.  Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). 
 201.  Tobias, supra note 187, at 383, 409–22. 
 202.  Id. at 383, 423. 
 203.  Id. at 435. 
 204.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F(1) (1979).   
 205.  1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28,  at 92–96. 
 206.  2 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 69, at app. B.  For the status of spousal tort immunity, see 
Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Modern Status of Interpersonal Tort Immunity in Personal Injury and 
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4.  The Role of Courts in Limiting Domestic Violence Claims 
It is remarkable that courts across the country maintained spousal 
immunity for tort claims through most of the 20th century.
207
  Even in some 
jurisdictions in which spousal immunity has been eliminated, courts have 
underhandedly maintained the doctrine.  To do so, courts have asserted 
policy reasons to retain spousal immunity for negligence actions and 
intentional torts.
208
  Most commonly, courts have set different standards for 
torts between spouses—thus effectively barring suits between spouses, 
especially in the area of emotional distress.
209
  In some instances, courts 
have even extended immunity to unmarried intimate partners.
210
 
In Twyman v. Twyman, the Texas Supreme Court held that spouses 
could recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress only if the 
tortious conduct was not considered in dividing the marital estate.
211
  
Dissenting in part, Chief Justice Phillips went beyond the majority’s 
limitation of IIED claims by explicitly stating that he believed that spouses 
or former spouses could not use the cause of action for conduct occurring 
during marriage.
212
  He wrote: 
In accordance with these sentiments, I believe that a tort which is 
grounded solely on a duty not to inflict emotional distress should not be 
cognizable in the context of marriage. 
Married couples share an intensely personal and intimate relationship. 
When discord arises, it is inevitable that the parties will suffer 
emotional distress, often severe.
213
 
Sheila Twyman alleged that William Twyman “intentionally and 
cruelly” attempted to coerce the plaintiff into performing deviant sexual acts 
during their marriage.
214
  She testified that he pursued these activities even 
though he knew she feared them because she had been raped at knifepoint 
before the marriage.
215
  The trial court found that the defendant in fact 
                                                          
Wrongful Death Actions, 92 A.L.R.3d 901 (1979). 
 207.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 902–03. 
 208.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. c, d (1979). 
 209.  Foster, supra note 206, at § 2[a]. 
 210.  See Baron v. Jeffer, 469 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816–17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
 211.  Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. 1993). 
 212.  Id. at 627 (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 620 (majority opinion). 
 215.  Id. at 620 n.1. 
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engaged in the alleged behavior.
216
  Nonetheless, Justice Phillips argued that 
the plaintiff should not recover simply because she was married to the 
defendant. 
New York courts have more directly maintained spousal immunity by 
refusing to allow tort claims between spouses and other intimate partners.  In 
Weicker v. Weicker,
217
 the New York Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff 
wife’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against her husband.  
The court did so based on the marital relationship between the parties.  It 
reasoned: 
Assuming that New York law now permits “recovery for the intentional 
inflicting of mental distress without proof of the breach of any duty 
other than the duty to refrain from inflicting it,” strong policy 
considerations militate against judicially applying these recent 
developments in this area of the law to the factual context of a dispute 
arising out of matrimonial differences.
218
 
In Baron v. Jeffer,
219
 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the 
State of New York extended the Weicker prohibition against intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims between spouses to a cohabiting 
couple.  In Baron, the plaintiff girlfriend sought damages for assault and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
220
  The court upheld the lower 
court’s decision to dismiss the assault claim based on a statute of limitations 
defense.
221
  The court then rejected the plaintiff’s intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim, citing the reasoning in Weicker.
222
  The court 
stated: 
[I]t would be contrary to public policy to recognize the existence of this 
type of tort in the context of disputes, as here, arising out of the 
differences which occur between persons who, although not married, 
have been living together as husband and wife for an extended period 
of time (here, over two years).
223
 
In New York, intentional infliction of emotional distress claims between 
                                                          
 216.  Id. at 620. 
 217.  237 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1968). 
 218.  Id. at 876–77 (citation omitted). 
 219. 469 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
 220.  Id. at 816. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. at 816–17. 
 223.  Id. at 817. 
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spouses and persons in marital-like relationships are still barred.
224
  By 
refusing to acknowledge intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in 
marital and marital-type relationships, courts in New York are continuing 
and expanding spousal immunity in modern times. 
In New Mexico, courts are also fostering spousal immunity for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims by setting an 
insurmountable bar for claims between spouses.  In Hakkila v. Hakkila, the 
New Mexico Court of Appeals set a very high bar for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claims by one spouse against the other.
225
  The Hakkila 
court found that IIED claims must be viewed differently if arising out of a 
marital relationship.  While acknowledging that spousal immunity had been 
abolished, the court articulated that there is only a “very limited scope for 
the tort in the marital context.”
226
  The court reasoned that: 
Conduct intentionally or recklessly causing emotional distress to one’s 
spouse is prevalent in our society.  This is unfortunate but perhaps not 
surprising, given the length and intensity of the marital relationship.  
Yet even when the conduct of feuding spouses is not particularly 
unusual, high emotions can readily cause an offended spouse to view 
the other’s misconduct as “extreme and outrageous.”  Thus, if the tort 
of outrage is construed loosely or broadly, claims of outrage may be 
tacked on in typical marital disputes, taxing judicial resources.
227
 
E. Arnold Hakkila had perpetrated domestic violence throughout the 
marriage, including repeatedly physically assaulting Peggy Hakkila, 
insulting her privately and in front of others, and refusing to allow her to 
pursue schooling or hobbies.
228
  The court held that Mr. Hakkila’s conduct 
                                                          
 224.  See Chen v. Fischer, 843 N.E.2d 723, 725 n.2 (N.Y. 2005) (agreeing that New York does 
not recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress claims by one spouse against another); 
Artache v. Goldin, 519 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (dismissing an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim when parties lived together for fourteen years and had four 
children together); Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (allowing a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress between parties formerly in an intimate partner 
cohabiting relationship because conduct on which claim was based occurred after the relationship 
had terminated); Ferreyr v. Soros, No. 109256/11, 2013 WL 388009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2013) 
(allowing a claim for intentional emotional distress to proceed because “the parties [sic] relationship, 
where the parties never lived together but at all times maintained separate households, falls well 
short of the marital type relationship that would bar plaintiff’s claim”).  But cf. Weisman v. 
Weisman, 485 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that plaintiff spouse had properly plead 
her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against her husband).   
 225.  Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). 
 226.  Id. at 1324. 
 227.  Id. at 1324–25. 
 228.  Id. at 1321–22. 
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was not sufficiently outrageous to sustain a claim for IIED.
229
 
The court reasoned that “in determining when the tort of outrage should 
be recognized in the marital setting, the threshold of outrageousness should 
be set high enough . . . that the social good from recognizing the tort will not 
be outweighed by unseemly and invasive litigation of meritless claims.”
230
  
Despite the repeated egregiousness of Mr. Hakkila’s abusive conduct, the 
court insisted that “[i]t would be unfortunate if the law closed all the safety 
valves through which irascible tempers might legally blow off steam.”
231
   
Hakkila, which was decided in 1991, is still controlling in New Mexico.
232
 
As exemplified in Hakkila, some courts continue to maintain de facto 
immunity in some types of domestic violence tort suits even when spousal 
immunity has been abrogated.
233
  Insurance companies, too, have joined 
these recalcitrant courts in perpetuating de facto immunity for domestic 
violence torts through their policy exclusions.
234
  Two insurance policy 
exclusions—intentional act exclusions and family member exclusions—act 




5.  The Lack of Insurance Coverage for Domestic Violence 
Intentional act exclusions deny coverage for any intentional acts 
                                                          
 229.  Id. at 1327.   
 230.  Id. at 1326. 
 231.  Id. at 1324 (quoting Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of 
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1053 (1936)). 
 232.  After Hakkila, the New Mexico Court of Appeals allowed a plaintiff to recover against his 
former wife for “fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, malicious abuse of process, and defamation” based 
on events that occurred during the marriage.  Papatheofanis v. Allen, 242 P.3d 358, 360 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2010).  The court, citing Hakkila, said such recovery would be allowed because the claims did 
not involve marital misconduct, details of the couple’s personal relationship, or issues regarding who 
was at fault for the dissolution of the marriage.  Id. at 365.   
 233.  For instance, South Dakota still retains spousal immunity for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Harbert, 741 N.W.2d 228 (S.D. 2007) 
(holding that state policy prohibits extension of insurance coverage to intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); Henry v. Henry, 534 N.W.2d 844, 847 (S.D. 1995) (holding that intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims will not be allowed based on conduct during marriage but will 
be allowed based on conduct after divorce); Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758, 761 (S.D. 
1989) (stating that infliction of emotional distress claims are “unavailable as a matter of public 
policy when it is predicated on conduct which leads to the dissolution of a marriage”). 
 234.  Jennifer Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance “Family Member 
Exclusions”: Shared Assumptions, Relational and Liberal Feminist Challenges, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 251, 252 (2002) [hereinafter Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance]. 
 235.  Id. at 252–53. 
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committed by the insured.
236
  Most homeowners, renters, and automobile 
insurance policies do not provide liability coverage for intentional acts under 
these intentional act exclusions.
237
  If a plaintiff sues for an intentional tort 
and the defendant has homeowners or renters insurance, the insurance 
company can successfully claim that the suit is not covered by the 
defendant’s policy based on the intentional act exclusion.
238
  In this way, a 
plaintiff can be “worse off if the tort . . . is classified as intentional rather 
than negligent.”
239
  Thus, domestic violence victims are essentially barred 
from recovering under an insurance policy for a tort arising from domestic 
violence because most such torts are intentional.  Victims may be tempted to 
argue that an injury resulted from the abuser’s negligence in order to obtain 
compensation.
240
  However, when victims must negate the intentional nature 
of the abuser’s act so that the harm will be covered by insurance, they are 




Family member exclusions in insurance policies also deny coverage for 
many domestic violence torts.
242
  Standard homeowners insurance policies 
define insured individuals as anyone living in the home and exclude 
coverage for any harm caused by one insured against another.
243
  These 
family member exclusions, which are included in most policies, exclude all 
claims for harm caused by one family member to another, regardless of 
                                                          
 236.  Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 135. 
 237.  Id. at 135–36.  See also Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance, supra note 
234, at 252; Wriggins, First-Year Torts, supra note 153, at 513. 
 238.  Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 739–49 (2012); 
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 136.  See, e.g., Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Coppola, 690 A.2d 1059, 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (upholding the lower court’s 
decision that insurance company was not obligated to defend or indemnify defendant for his acts of 
abuse against his former wife under a homeowners policy).  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 1 cmt. f (2010) (“[B]ecause the express and implied exclusions 
[for intentional torts] from the coverage provided by liability-insurance policies may not be 
completely congruent with tort-law categories, the proper interpretation of these policy provisions 
and public-policy doctrines is ultimately a matter for contract and insurance law, not tort law.”); 
Hazel Glenn Beh, Tort Liability for Intentional Acts of Family Members: Will Your Insurer Stand By 
You?, 68 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the 
Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. Rev. 1721 (1997). 
 239.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 5 cmt. a (2010). 
 240.  Dalton, supra note 66, at 341. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 137.   
 243.  Id.  See generally Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Validity, Under Insurance Statutes, of 
Coverage Exclusion for Injury to or Death of Insured’s Family or Household Members, 52 
A.L.R.4th 18 (1987). 
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whether the harm was accidental or intentional.
244
  Thus, if a wife sues a 
husband for injuries arising from domestic violence, the insurance policy 
will not cover the husband for the claim.
245
  The wife can only recover from 
the husband’s assets or their marital assets, but only if there are any assets or 
sufficient assets.
246
  Some courts have struck down the family member 
exclusion, especially in the automobile insurance context.
247
  These family 




States also participate in perpetuating immunity for domestic violence 
torts through regulation of insurance.  State legislation controls certain 
aspects of insurance contracts and markets.
249
  Intentional act and family 
member exclusions, as supported by state regulation, operate to deny 
recovery to domestic violence plaintiffs, especially those suing abusers who 
are judgment proof or have few assets.
250
 
Insurance policies, recalcitrant courts, and a long history of common 
law resistant to redress for intimate partner violence have created a void 
where domestic violence tort law might have developed but did not.  During 
the times of chastisement, coverture, and spousal immunity, domestic 
violence plaintiffs did not have the benefit of a supportive movement to 
encourage them to challenge the laws that barred these claims.  The 
domestic violence movement did not emerge until the 1970s.
251
  Spousal 
immunity became the minority rule in the 1970s as well.  This could have 
been a time when domestic violence tort claims came to the fore.  Instead, 
                                                          
 244.  Wriggins, First-Year Torts Curriculum, supra note 153, at 513. 
 245.  Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance, supra note 234, at 252. 
 246.  Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 137–38.   
 247.  Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance, supra note 234, at 252–53 n.11. 
 248.  Id. at 252 n.10 (citing ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 393 § 
4.9(c)(1) (1988)). 
 249.  Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance, supra note 234, at 255. 
 250.  Jennifer Wriggins proposes insurance reform that would help ensure that domestic violence 
plaintiffs satisfy tort judgments.  Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83.  Under 
Wriggins’s proposal, liability insurance would be a mandatory part of automobile liability insurance.  
Id. at 152.  The insurance policy would cover domestic violence tort claims, and defendants would 
be required to reimburse insurers for payments made to satisfy domestic violence tort judgments.  Id.  
These reformed insurance policies would also include “uninsured domestic violence tortfeasor” 
provisions in case the abuser is uninsured.  Id. at 127, 153.  If the defendant is uninsured, the 
plaintiff’s recovery would be covered by the plaintiff’s own uninsured domestic violence tortfeasor 
section of her policy.  Id. at 152–54.   
 251.  See generally SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND 
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 53–131 (1982) (discussing the foundations of 
the Battered Women’s Movement); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF 
SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 182–200 
(1987).  
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the domestic violence movement was primarily focused on developing 
shelters and criminal justice interventions.
252
  In the meantime, insurance 
companies stepped in to maintain spousal immunity and expand immunity to 
non-married intimate partners through intentional act and family member 
exclusions.  Very few domestic violence tort claims have emerged from this 
unfavorable history. 
C.  Other Reasons for Scarcity of Domestic Violence Tort Claims 
In addition to the gendered history of common law and insurance 
exclusions, there are a number of other possible reasons that domestic 
violence tort suits are so rare.
253
 
In general, intentional tort claims are infrequently pursued.  The 
National Center for State Courts reports that tort claims in general comprise 
of only about 6% of all state court cases.
254
  Of these, automobile tort cases 
constitute the majority.
255
  Intentional tort claims constitute a small fraction 
of tort cases, with intentional torts comprising of as few as 2.9% of all tort 
claims in state courts in 1992.
256
  Intentional torts have also been largely 
omitted from tort doctrine and scholarship, with negligence and strict 
liability dominating.
257
  Torts including assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress have received little attention 
from scholars and play an insignificant role in the field of torts generally.
258
  
Instead, tort law “has been conceptualized as pertaining primarily to 
                                                          
 252.  See generally SCHECHTER, supra note 251, at 53–131.  
 253.  For other explanations for the dearth of domestic violence tort cases, including reasons of 
privacy, see Buel, supra note 146, at 949–55. 
 254.  ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2012), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/otherpages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csp_dec.ashx.  In 
2008, new tort claims comprised 4.4% of all claims brought in state courts.  ROBERT C. 
LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE 
COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 26 (2010), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/other-pages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/ewsc-2008-online.ashx 
[hereinafter 2008 CASELOADS].  In 2007, such tort claims constituted 6% of all claims brought in 
state courts.  Id. 
 255.  2008 CASELOADS, supra note 254, at 28. 
 256.  STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
153177, TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES  2 (1995), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/TCILC.PDF.  Only 2.7% of civil jury cases that went to trial in 
state courts were intentional tort cases.  CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  NCJ 154346, CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2 
(1995), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf. 
 257.  Wriggins, Feminist Revision of Torts, supra note 153, at 153. 
 258.  Id. 
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accidental injury that causes harm to strangers.”
259
 
1.  Financial Resources 
Financial resources play a large role in determining whether domestic 
violence torts suits are initiated.  Representation in these cases is nearly 
impossible to secure through a legal services or nonprofit law office.  Any 
legal services agency that receives funding through the federal Legal 
Services Corporation (LSC) is prohibited from engaging in certain types of 
activities and representation.  One such restriction is that, with limited 
exceptions, the agency cannot pursue a fee generating claim, unless the 
claim has been either “rejected by the local lawyer referral service, or by two 
private attorneys[,] or [if] [n]either the referral service nor the two private 
attorneys” would provide a consultation without a fee.
260
  If the legal 
services office satisfies this requirement and accepts a fee-generating case, it 
must meet additional onerous paperwork and audit requirements.
261
 
Additionally, legal services or nonprofit law offices that receive funding 
from the Legal Assistance for Victims (“LAV”) Grant Program are 
prohibited from using any grant funds to support litigating domestic violence 
tort claims.
262
  The LAV Grant Program, which is maintained by the Office 
on Violence Against Women at the U.S. Department of Justice, is a primary 
funder of legal representation of domestic violence victims.
263
  This federal 
funding stream for domestic violence lawyering was created by the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994 and was reauthorized in 2000, 2005, and 2013; 
it made domestic violence attorneys in legal services offices more 
commonplace.
264
  Even though the grant requires that grantees address a 
“demonstrated need in their communities by providing services that promote 
the dignity and self-sufficiency of victims, improve their access to resources, 
                                                          
 259.  Id.  See also Wriggins, First-Year Torts Curriculum, supra note 153, at 514. 
 260.  45 C.F.R. § 1609.3(a)(1)–(2) (2011). 
 261.  § 1609.4. See also 1609 Fee-Generating Cases, LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, OFFICE 
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, https://www.oig.lsc.gov/aud/cs98/cs981609.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 
2014).  
 262.  OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1122-0020, 
OVW FISCAL YEAR 2013 LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS GRANT PROGRAM 10–11 (2013), 
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/2013-lav-solicitation.pdf [hereinafter LAV 2013]. 
 263.  See id. at 3. 
 264.  See Rhonda McMillion, Congress Moves to Reauthorize Laws Targeting Domestic 
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and create options for victims seeking safety from perpetrator violence,”
265
 
LAV grantees are prohibited from using LAV funds to pursue tort claims.
266
  
The Program specifically prohibits using grant funds to support legal 
representation of victims in tort actions.
267
 
2.  Attorney’s Fees 
The system for payment of attorney’s fees also diminishes the number 
of domestic violence tort suits.  Under the “American rule” for attorney’s 
fees, “the losing party is not required to pay the winning party’s fees.”
268
  
Generally plaintiffs pay their own attorney’s fees.
269
  The plaintiff can either 
front the attorney’s fees or seek representation on a contingency fee basis.  If 
the case is taken on a contingency fee basis, the attorney is paid a percentage 
of the plaintiff’s recovery.
270
  If the plaintiff does not prevail, the attorney is 
not compensated.
271
  In the domestic violence context, this means that the 
plaintiff must either pay the lawyer using her own resources or find a lawyer 
who is willing to take the case based on a calculation that the claim will 
prevail and provide sufficient recovery such that the lawyer’s contingency 
fee will be sufficient.  Very few domestic violence victims will have enough 
financial resources to pay an attorney to litigate a tort matter.  Thus, whether 
a domestic violence tort suit is brought can depend on the attorney’s 
expectation of recovery. 
The possibility for recovery in domestic violence tort suits can be quite 
low.  Abusers often have little or no resources to seek through a tort claim.  
Even if the plaintiff obtains a sizable damages award, the defendant may not 
have sufficient resources to satisfy the judgment.  Plaintiff-side attorneys are 
reluctant to litigate cases when the chance of receiving a sufficient 
contingency fee is small.  Similarly, the plaintiff may decide that the 
possible therapeutic, deterrent, or other benefits are not sufficient to warrant 
filing a claim when the odds of financial recovery are low. 
                                                          
 265.  LAV 2013, supra note 262, at 18. 
 266.  Id. at 10–11. 
 267.  Id.  The LAV Program also specifies that grant funds cannot be used to support legal 
representation in “[c]hild sexual abuse cases,” “[c]ases involving the child protection system,” and 
“[c]riminal defense of victims charged with crimes.”  Id.  Additionally, grant funds cannot be used to 
support lobbying, fundraising, research projects, or physical renovations of office space.  Id.   
 268.  DOBBS, supra note 2, at 38.  
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. 
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3.  Other Concerns 
There are a number of other possible reasons that domestic violence tort 
cases are rarely filed.  A victim may fear retaliation by the abuser, and it 
may not be safe for her to pursue a tort claim.  A victim may prefer to avoid 
contentious litigation for the sake of tranquility, especially if the abuser is 
the father of her children.  She may have had bad experiences with legal 
processes before or may not be willing to experience the stress that litigation 
may cause.  The victim may have higher priorities for legal intervention, 
including cases involving restraining orders, child custody, child support, 
housing, and public benefits.  Lawyers, too, play a limiting role in the 
development of domestic violence tort jurisprudence.  Domestic violence 
attorneys tend to specialize, almost always in civil restraining order or 
family law cases.
272
  Even if their funding permits them to do so, these 
attorneys may feel uncomfortable or unqualified to litigate tort claims.  They 
also may not be advising their clients about tort law as an avenue of relief.  
If domestic violence victims are not aware of the availability of these claims, 
they will not pursue them. 
There are also procedural issues that can limit the number of domestic 
violence tort suits.  While these procedural complications in domestic 
violence tort law are beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning 
the most common of them.  Statutes of limitations, which are usually one to 
six years for intentional torts, operate as a bar to many domestic violence 
tort claims.
273
  A number of procedural complications can arise if there is or 
                                                          
 272.  See Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving Forward 
in Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 239 (2011). 
 273.  See Dalton, supra note 66, at 357–63 (discussing the effect of statutes of limitations on 
domestic violence claims and arguing for a universal tolling provision in domestic abuse cases); 
Buel, supra note 146, at 1015–18 (arguing for the tolling of statutes of limitations in domestic 
violence claims under the continuing tort doctrine to prevent abusers from defending on statutes of 
limitations grounds); Jerry J. Phillips, What is a Good Woman Worth? Tort Compensation for 
Domestic Violence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 303, 308 (2001) (arguing for the application of the continuing 
tort doctrine to domestic violence claims to prevent the “roadblock” of statutes of limitaitons); 
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 139–40 (explaining that because of the 
“complex dynamics of domestic violence,” many times when the victim is ready to sue, the statute 
has already run); Edward S. Snyder, Remedies for Domestic Violence: A Continuing Challenge, 12 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 335, 360–64 (1994) (arguing that domestic violence should be treated as 
a continuing tort so that statutes of limitations will not operate as a bar to a victim’s recovery); 
Barbara H. Young, Interspousal Torts and Divorce: Problems, Policies, Procedures, 27 J. FAM. L. 
489, 491–93 (1989) (discussing interspousal torts and the statute of limitations, and stating that the 
“greatest impetus for bringing the tort action before or during the divorce is the running of the statute 
of limitation on the tort”); Michelle L. Evans, Note, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The 
Child that No Area of the Law Wants to Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465, 481–83 (2009) 
(discussing approaches to the statute of limitations problem in interspousal tort claims). 
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has been a divorce proceeding between the parties.  States may require that 
the tort and divorce cases be joined if the tortious conduct occurred during 
the marriage, and the abuser may raise res judicata or collateral estoppel as a 
defense.
274
  Also, boilerplate release clauses in divorce settlements or 
judgments can prohibit a domestic violence plaintiff from bringing a tort 
case. 
IV.  BENEFITS OF TORT SUITS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PLAINTIFFS: 
FINANCIAL BENEFITS, THERAPEUTIC BENEFITS, ENHANCEMENT OR 
REPLACEMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES, DETERRENCE 
A. Financial Benefits 
Domestic violence victims largely shoulder the cost of the domestic 
violence to which they are subjected.
275
  They often must bear the cost of 
medical and mental health treatment that results from an abusive 
relationship.
276
  Separating from an abuser and establishing a new household 
                                                          
 274.  See Dalton, supra note 66, at 374–79 (identifying New Jersey as a state that requires 
divorce and tort claims to be joined, and providing examples of res judicata barring victim’s tort 
claims “on the grounds that the issue of their partners’ abuse was fully addressed in the context of 
the divorce”); Buel, supra note 146, at 1000–07, 1010–14 (discussing joinder and presclusion issues, 
and noting how “disproportionate division of property” is rarely employed “to provide some 
measure of compensation for the harmed spouse”); Phillips, supra note 273, at 309 (explaining that 
if a victim brings a tort suit after a divorce, “a court may find that the divorce is preclusive on the 
issue of damages,” and suggesting that “the best approach may be to try the divorce case first, with 
open disclosure to the court of a pending or contemplated tort suit,” with the fact finder being 
permitted to consider the divorce award in the tort suit); Scherer, supra note 149, at 567–73 
(discussing problems that joinder and preclusion create for domestic violence claims and providing 
examples of state claims); Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly 
Causing Severe Emotional Distress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1253, 1295–
300 (1994) (identifying preclusion problems that may arise when brining an infliction of emotional 
distress claim after a divorce); Snyder, supra note 273, at 354–60 (discussing joinder and preclusion 
issues and warning that victims “must be vigilant in joining claims because a failure to do so can 
result in a res judicata bar to future attempts to gain redress for tortious wrongs”); Young, supra note 
273, at 500–03 (identifying “the greatest risk of the operation of res judicata and equitable estoppel 
[as] postponing the tort claim,” because although pursuing the tort claim first may permit the court to 
“consider the tort judgment when it divides property and awards maintenance and child support,” it 
cannot “preclude a later divorce”); Evans, supra note 273, at 483–89 (discussing the effects of 
joining torts and divorce actions, and explaining the tests courts use to determine if an interspousal 
tort is precluded). 
 275.  Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 147 (“[C]osts of these domestic 
violence torts, financial and nonfinancial, are borne largely by the victims. . . .”).  “Partial estimates 
show that violent crime against women costs this country at least 3 billion—not million, but 
billion—dollars a year.” U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 632 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 
S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 33 (1990)). 
 276.  Barbara J. Hart & Erika A. Sussman, Civil Tort Suits and Economic Justice for Battered 
Women, VICTIM ADVOCATE, Spring 2004, at 3, 4. 
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can be very expensive, and victims are usually primarily responsible for 
financially supporting their children.
277
  Child support and spousal support 
awards are often insufficient.
278
  Victims also may not receive court-ordered 
child support or alimony—either because the abuser chooses not to pay or 
because the abuser has lost his job due to criminal charges or 
incarceration.
279
  The criminal justice system allows for victim restitution, 
but “in practice, only a small fraction of expended victims compensation 
funds go to domestic violence victims.”
280
  The types of compensation 
available are narrow, and the amount of restitution can be insufficient.
281
  
Additionally, restitution frequently remains uncollectable.
282
 
Financial recovery from domestic violence tort cases can not only help 
victims meet immediate financial needs but also set them up for self-
sufficiency and long-term safety.
283
  Tort damages awards may help victims 
compensate for economic losses sustained during the relationship, such as 
personal property losses when an abuser has broken or sold the victim’s 
property, income and future earning losses when the abuser has controlled 
employment or educational opportunities, and debt incurred by the abuser 
that also binds the victim.
284
  While tort damages awards are not meant to 
compensate for these specific losses, these awards can be particularly 
meaningful to domestic violence victims given the economic challenges they 
face.  Abusers almost never bear any financial responsibility for the financial 
harms caused by their abusive conduct, and tort suits can shift the financial 
burden from the victim to the abuser through damages awards.
285
 
Tort claims offer domestic violence victims the opportunity to receive 
monetary awards related to the harm they have suffered—including 
                                                          
 277.  Id. at 3–4. 
 278.  Id. at 4. 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 147 (citing Desmond S. Greer, A 
Transatlantic Perspective on the Compensation of Crime Victims in the United States, 85 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 333, 348 (1994)).  See also Hart & Sussman, supra note 276, at 4. 
 281.  Hart & Sussman, supra note 276, at 4. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  See id. at 8 (instructing that “[i]t is important to view tort litigation as just one among 
numerous potential legal strategies employed within a larger safety plan,” because “the tort attorney 
can assist in holding the batterer accountable for the violence, while helping the client achieve the 
economic justice required for her safety and freedom”).  
 284.  See, e.g., id. at 4, 6.  See generally Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer 
Credit in Domestic Violence, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 951 (2012) (explaining how abusers coerce their 
victims into debt, how debt prevents victims from leaving the abusive relationship, and what effects 
“coerced debt” has). 
 285.  Dalton, supra note 66, at 389–90 (noting that “the abuser never fully pays the bill 
associated with his abuse,” and that the tort system could better compensate victims). 
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compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages.
286
 
1.  Compensatory Damages 
Compensatory damages are available to victims in negligence, 
recklessness, and intentional tort claims.  Compensatory damages include 
medical expenses and other expenses proximately caused by the injury, lost 
earnings and lost earning capacity, and pain and suffering.
287
  The damages 
are generally awarded in a lump sum, accounting for past and future losses 
that are proximately caused by the injury.
288
  Compensable physical injury is 
very common in domestic violence relationships.  The incidence of physical 
injury of victims in domestic violence relationships is extremely high.
289
  In 
one study, 88% of victims were injured “in the most violent incident” of 
domestic violence, with 67% of the victims suffering severe injury.
290
  In 
addition, 32% of women had been injured “in the most recent incident” of 
domestic violence, 5% severely.
291
 
A domestic violence plaintiff is entitled to recover for any pain and 
suffering proximately caused by the tortious conduct.  Recovery for pain 
includes compensation for pain suffered at the time of or after the liability-
causing incident and pain from medical treatment of injuries arising from the 
incident.
292
  Domestic violence also results in compensable mental harm, 
including fear, anxiety, damaged self-esteem, depression, and post-traumatic 
stress syndrome.
293
  This harm is awarded as “suffering” in recovery for pain 
and suffering.
294
  Domestic violence plaintiffs can seek recovery for 
emotional anguish, distress, or any other negative emotional impact that 
proximately results from the perpetrator’s tortious conduct.
295
  Victims can 
receive damages for these emotional losses themselves as well as the cost of 
addressing these losses through psychotherapy and other mental health 
                                                          
 286.  See Dalton, supra note 66, at 390 (“The award can recognize pain and suffering, as well as 
the tangible elements, such as medical expenses and lost earnings; punitive damages are also a 
possibility.”). 
 287.  DOBBS, supra note 2, at 1048. 
 288.  Id. at 1047. 
 289.  See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 1 (“25–30 percent of women who come to emergency 
rooms for injuries are there for domestic violence-related problems.”). 
 290.  Id. at 39, 92–93. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  DOBBS, supra note 2, at 1050–51. 
 293.  Id. at 41–43. 
 294.  See Dalton, supra note 66, at 390 (“The award [against the abuser] can recognize pain and 
suffering.”). 
 295.  DOBBS, supra note 2, at 1051.  
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services, usually framed as medical and related expenses. 
2. Nominal Damages 
Domestic violence plaintiffs can pursue additional damages in 
intentional tort claims.  Nominal damages, which are not available in 
negligence claims, are available for intentional torts.  In negligence, the 
plaintiff must suffer a legally recognized harm in order to have a cognizable 
claim.
296
  For intentional torts, such as battery, sexual battery, assault, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment, the 
legally recognized harm is the tort itself.
297
  For intentional torts, the plaintiff 
can recover nominal damages and potentially “a substantial [additional] sum 
without proof of any specific loss other than the tort itself.”
298
  For instance, 
a domestic violence victim who is falsely imprisoned may be entitled to 
substantial damages even though she was not physically injured, did not 
suffer from lost wages, and did not introduce evidence of emotional harm.
299
 
3.  Punitive Damages 
Domestic violence victims also can seek punitive damages for 
intentional torts.  Punitive damages are permitted in a great majority of 
states.
300
  Generally, punitive damages require a showing of serious 
misconduct with a bad intent or state of mind like malice.
301
  Many acts of 
domestic violence constitute serious misconduct perpetrated by an abuser 
who is intentionally causing harm.  Thus, domestic violence tort claims are 
ripe for seeking punitive damages awards.  Punitive damage awards can be 
problematic in that jury awards of punitive damages are subject to judicial 
review and can be reduced or reversed.
302
 
Punitive damages awards can be very important in a domestic violence 
tort suit, however.  Abusers commonly prevent victims from working or 
                                                          
 296.  Id. at 1047 (footnote omitted). 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Id. at 80. 
 300.  Id. at 1062.   
 301.  Id. at 1064; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (“Punitive damages may 
be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless 
indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly 
consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that 
the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.”). 
 302.  Phillips, supra note 273, at 310. 
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seeking an education.
303
  Women statistically earn less than men and tend to 
occupy the homemaking role more frequently than men.
304
  These financial 
disadvantages will play out in computation of compensatory damages 
awards for domestic violence victims, who are largely women.  Computation 
of damages for lost wages and lost earning capacity are based on prior 
earnings and projected future earnings.
305
  The combination of gender and 
the financial abuse present in most domestic violence relationships will 
ultimately reduce compensatory damages awards for lost wages or lost 
earning capacity for most victims.
306
  Punitive damages awards can help to 
boost domestic violence victims’ recovery to make it more on par with 
damages awards given to plaintiffs who have not been financially 
disadvantaged by gender and domestic violence.  Punitive damages also 
carry a punishing sting for the defendant, hopefully creating deterrence of 
future abusive conduct.  Punitive damages may also provide some 
therapeutic benefits to plaintiffs, as discussed below.
307
  The purposes of 
punitive damages are to punish the defendant and to deter him from 
engaging in similar conduct in the future.
308
 
4.  Examples of Domestic Violence Tort Damages Awards 
The amount of damages awards in tort cases can vary greatly.
309
  Most 
domestic violence plaintiffs will not receive enormous damages awards.  
Modest damages awards are common in the domestic violence tort actions 
that have been brought.
310




                                                          
 303.  Hart & Sussman, supra note 276, at 6. 
 304.  Phillips, supra note 273, at 311 (citation omitted).  
 305.  Id. 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  See supra part III.B. 
 308.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1979). 
 309.  See 1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 99–107, 111–12, 118–34, 141–43, 143–46 for 
discussion of domestic violence tort damages awards in specific cases.  The majority of damage 
awards for sexual abuse are between $60,000 to $250,000 but they can be as high as millions of 
dollars.  VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:21. 
 310.  See, e.g., Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 612–13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (awarding 
a plaintiff who cohabited with her boyfriend for twelve years $15,000 in compensatory damages and 
$4,000 in punitive damages for assault and battery for injuries sustained when her boyfriend broke 
her arm); Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1138, 1144 (Me. 1993) (awarding $75,000 in 
compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress). 
 311.  E.g., Results, DONOVAN & O’CONNOR, LLP, http://www.docattypi.com/Results.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2014).  In 2006 Chris Dodig obtained a $9.5 million judgment in the Berkshire 
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In one Texas case, O’Keiff v. Christ, a domestic violence victim was 
awarded $10.9 million in compensatory damages, $150 million in punitive 
damages, and approximately $9 million in court costs and interest.
312
  The 
husband, who was a plastic surgeon, shot his wife in the face, causing her to 
lose her left eye and 95% of her hearing in her right ear.  She required 
thirteen surgeries to repair her shattered eye, nose bones, and frontal 
sinuses.
313
  In another Texas case, In re Brown, Darlina Brown received a 
multi-million dollar jury verdict after seeking recovery for domestic violence 
tort harms as part of her divorce suit.
314
  Brown claimed that her husband 
Michael Brown, “a prominent surgeon . . . beat [her while pregnant] so 
severely that she went into premature labor.”
315
  She prevailed on her claims 
for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
316
  On these 
claims, the trial court awarded Ms. Brown a judgment of more than $5.2 
million including $2 million in punitive damages.
317
 
In Massachusetts, Tawnya Underhill received a $9 million tort judgment 
against her former boyfriend, Paul Rathbun.
318
  The Berkshire Superior 
Court made this award based on one incident of domestic violence.
319
  
Rathbun broke Underhill’s neck during a domestic violence incident that 
took place in a car at a resort in Massachusetts.
320
  Underhill was left 
paralyzed as a result of the incident.
321
 
In Curtis v. Firth, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s $1 
million judgment.
322
  In that case, the domestic violence plaintiff received a 
judgment for $50,000 in compensatory damages for battery, $225,000 for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and $725,000 in punitive 
                                                          
Superior Court on behalf of a quadriplegic client victimized by domestic violence.  Id.  
 312.  1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 105–06 (citing O’Keiff v. Christ, No. 92-28795-A 
(Dist. Ct. Tex., Apr. 6, 1994)). 
 312.  Id. 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  In Re Brown, 277 S.W.3d 474, 476 (Tex. App. 2009).  
 315.  Carolyn Magnuson, Marital Tort Lawsuits Can Make Abusers Pay, TRIAL, Feb. 2002, at 
12–13. 
 316.  Brown, 277 S.W.3d at 476.  
 317.  Id. (denying Michael Brown’s petition for writ of mandamus while summarizing lower 
court’s decision on domestic violence tort claims). 
 318.  Paralyzed Woman Wins Lawsuit in Pittsfield, TIME WARNER CABLE NEWS (Dec. 12, 2003, 
10:56 AM), http://capitalregion.ynn.com/content/54969/paralyzed-woman-wins-lawsuit-in-
pittsfield/. 
 319.  Buel, supra note 146, at 952. 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  Id. 
 322.  Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749, 752, 762 (Idaho 1993). 
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damages.
323
  Carl Curtis and Sandra Firth had been living together in an 
intimate partner relationship for ten years.
324
  The relationship “was 
characterized by cycles of violence.”
325
  Firth testified that Curtis sexually 
assaulted her, anally raped her, and forced her to engage in sexual acts that 
she found repugnant.
326
  Still more: Curtis publically screamed at Firth and 
swore at her; he kicked her out of bed using his foot on her back; he shook 
her so hard she feared she would fall off a boat dock; he slapped her on the 
buttocks so hard that it left a hand print; and, he pulled her hair while 
throwing her against a sink.
327
 
Damages awards, large or small, provide financial compensation in an 
effort to make the plaintiff “whole.”  Damages offer the plaintiff financial 
resources for medical and mental health treatment and some financial 
stability in the face of lost wages.  They can also provide monetary 
recognition of emotional harm and, in some cases, acknowledgment of the 
egregiousness of the abuser’s conduct through punitive damages.  This 
“transfer of a single sum from the defendant to the plaintiff” is intended to 
be “the remedial embodiment of the correlative nature of doing and suffering 
harm.”
328
  Damages awards can never fully right the wrong perpetrated on 
the plaintiff by her intimate partner.  However, as will be discussed below, a 
domestic violence plaintiff can receive other nonfinancial benefits from 
pursuing a tort claim against an abuser. 
B.  Therapeutic Benefits 
Tort actions can provide domestic violence plaintiffs with nonfinancial 
benefits beyond the financial gain offered by damages awards.  Victims may 
be motivated by the “psychological primacy of compensation” offered by 
tort suits.
329
  However, financial compensation is not the only benefit that is 
sought.  A plaintiff may choose to file a tort suit in an attempt to meet an 
emotional need or fulfill a moral imperative.
330
  The literature on therapeutic 
                                                          
 323.  Id. at 752. 
 324.  Id. at 751. 
 325.  Id.  
 326.  Id. at 757. 
 327.  Id.  
 328.  Weinrib, supra note 60, at 513. 
 329.  Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 
48–51 (1994). 
 330.  Edie Greene, “Can We Talk?” Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Restorative Justice and Tort 
Litigation, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 233, 
234 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008); see Linda K. Meier & Brian K. Zoeller, Taking Abusers to 
Court: Civil Remedies for Domestic Violence Victims, TRIAL, June 1995, at 60, 64. 
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jurisprudence offers some insight into the therapeutic outcomes of tort cases 
for plaintiffs.  Therapeutic jurisprudence examines how legal rules, legal 
procedures, and the roles of legal actors—including litigants, judges, and 
lawyers—act as agents in producing therapeutic or anti-therapeutic 
consequences.
331
  Therapeutic benefits almost certainly occur when a 
plaintiff is successful in her claim.  However, the very act of being a plaintiff 
in a tort suit has the potential to provide therapeutic benefits. 
The therapeutic benefits for plaintiffs in tort suits generally encompass a 
wide spectrum.  A tort claim can help provide closure for a plaintiff.
332
  
Pursuing a tort claim can aid in dissipating negative feelings, including 
relieving the plaintiff’s feelings of outrage, resentment, and anger.
333
  The 
dissipation of these feelings can result from the satisfaction that the 
defendant has been punished for the harm caused or that the plaintiff has 
been compensated for the loss suffered.
334
  A court’s finding of fault in the 
defendant can soothe the victim’s loss of dignity.
335
  Pursuing a tort claim 
can also be very empowering for the plaintiff. 
The act of being a plaintiff in a tort suit also can aid specifically in the 
healing process for victims of violence.  Victims of violence usually desire 
redress for the injustice inflicted on them, and the quest for compensation 
can be an important part of the victim’s recovery.
336
  The victim’s primary 
objective is not necessarily seeking financial compensation.  Instead, she is 
likely to be seeking an acknowledgment of harm, an apology, or public 
humiliation of the perpetrator.
337
 
                                                          
 331.  David B. Wexler, An Orientation to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. 
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 259, 259 (1994) (“The therapeutic jurisprudence heuristic suggests that the 
law itself can be seen to function as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent.  Legal rules, legal 
procedures, and the roles of legal actors . . . constitute social forces that . . . often produce 
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences.”); Michael L. Perlin, What is Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623, 623–24 (1993). 
 332.  See Shuman, supra note 329, at 50–51 (“[P]unishment of wrongdoers ‘tends to relieve the 
outraged feelings of those who have been hurt; after its infliction their anger abates, and they tend to 
regard the incident as closed.’”). 
 333.  Id.  
 334.  See id. at 51 (“The resentment of the victim and of society can be appeased by punishment 
(the criminal sanction) or satisfied by reparation (the civil sanction).”). 
 335.  See id. at 50 (“[T]here is ample contemporary evidence to suggest that tort damages may 
play a powerful role in the restorative process.”). 
 336.  JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 190 (1992).  
 337.  Id.  Herman discusses the value of compensation in a victim’s recovery but also notes the 
hurdle that a victim’s attachment to compensation can provide.  Id.  “The quest for fair 
compensation . . . also presents a potential trap.  Prolonged, fruitless struggles to wrest compensation 
from the perpetrator or from others may represent a defense against facing the full reality of what 
was lost. . . .  Though the fantasy is about empowerment, in reality the struggle for compensation ties 
the patient’s fate to that of the perpetrator and holds her recovery hostage to his whims.  
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Involving the civil judicial system can offer the plaintiff 
acknowledgment of and validation for the wrongness of the harms suffered.  
Tort suits provide litigants with an opportunity to articulate their harms and 
have their experiences validated.  Plaintiffs file tort claims “as a way to be 
heard and to have their claims dignified by a court of law.”
338
  For a 
domestic violence victim, the opportunity to tell a judge or a jury about the 
abuse she has endured can be very powerful.  Establishing that the plaintiff’s 
“case is worthy of judicial attention may provide satisfaction and validation 
to some plaintiffs.”
339
  A verdict for the plaintiff can be extremely 
therapeutic. 
Tort claims also give domestic violence victims an opportunity to exert 
power in an otherwise subordinating relationship.  In general, the availability 
of compensation through the tort system allows tort litigants to enlist the 




There is insufficient data concerning the therapeutic effects of 
participation in tort litigation on parties.
341
  Similarly, therapeutic 
jurisprudence has not yet comprehensively addressed the extent to which 
successful outcomes of tort cases assist in a plaintiff’s restoration.
342
 
One article published in Canada examined the therapeutic benefits for 
victims of sexual assault who were plaintiffs in tort suits.
343
  Bruce 
Feldthusen analyzed the therapeutic jurisprudence implications for plaintiffs 
in thirty-three sexual battery tort cases filed in Canada.
344
  He found that 
many of these plaintiffs reported therapeutic, nonfinancial motivations for 
                                                          
Paradoxically, the patient may liberate herself from the perpetrator when she renounces the hope of 
getting any compensation from him.”  Id.   
 338.  Greene, supra note 330, at 235. 
 339.  Id. 
 340.  Shuman, supra note 329, at 56.  In studying the Mexican Zapotec courts, and the use of 
such courts to reshape personal relationships, Laura Nader noted that “[t]he Zapotec ideal is not an 
‘eye for an eye,’ but rather what restores personal relations to equilibrium.”  LAURA NADER, STYLES 
OF COURT PROCEDURE: TO MAKE THE BALANCE, IN LAW AND CULTURE IN SOCIETY 73 (Laura 
Nader ed., 1969); PATRICK ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 471, 553 (3d ed. 
1980). (“When a person is involved in a dispute with another who he thinks has done wrong, and 
when that other refuses to admit that he has done wrong (and sometimes even when he does admit 
it), it may be a great satisfaction to the former to know that he has the right to summon the latter 
before one of Her Majesty’s judges for a public confrontation in which the latter may be branded as 
in the wrong.”). 
 341.  Greene, supra note 330, at 235–36. 
 342.  Shuman, supra note 329, at 50. 
 343.  Bruce Feldthusen, The Civil Action for Sexual Battery: Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 25 
OTTAWA L. REV. 203 (1993).   
 344.  Id. at 206 n.5.   
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suing.
345
  The plaintiffs’ therapeutic motivations for filing a tort claim 
included furthering the healing process, punishing the defendant, publicly 
vindicating the wrong, and encouraging other victims.
346
 
Feldthusen found that the prospect of financial compensation for a 
plaintiff who has been the victim of sexual assault often is not the driving 
motivator in filing a tort claim.
347
  He noted that plaintiffs who file tort 
claims for sexual battery often file and litigate these claims even if they 
know in advance that there would be almost no prospect of collecting a 
judgment.
348
  The ability to pursue a tort claim for these victims instead 
offers them other nonfinancial benefits.
349
 
A study of the therapeutic benefits for domestic violence plaintiffs has 
yet to be conducted.  In the absence of empirical evidence concerning the 
therapeutic benefits of tort litigation for plaintiffs in general, it is difficult to 
determine whether the therapeutic benefits outweigh the counter-therapeutic 
benefits.  It is possible that the counter-therapeutic impact of litigating a tort 
claim outweighs the positive consequences both for plaintiffs in general and 
domestic violence plaintiffs in particular.  Litigation can be a traumatic 
process, and the continuing contentiousness of the case and attendant stress 
can outweigh the benefits of pursuing the litigation.
350
  The litigation process 
itself can halt or delay the plaintiff’s process of healing and restoration.
351
  
Litigation often has health and mental-health costs for parties—sometimes 
leading to lingering medical and psychological issues.
352
  It is also time 
intensive, taking away from the plaintiff’s time for work, family, and 
recreation.
353
  The victim may have negative experiences within the 
                                                          
 345.  Id. at 211. 
 346.  Id. at 211–12. 
 347.  Id. at 210. 
 348.  Id.  
 349.  While beyond the scope of this paper and not immediately related to domestic violence, it 
is important to note that the body of research on victim participation in truth and reconciliation 
commissions has been inconclusive on whether victim testimony has therapeutic value for the 
victim.  See, e.g., Debra Kaminer et al., The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: 
Relation to Psychiatric Status and Forgiveness Among Survivors of Human Rights Abuses, 178.4 
THE BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 373 (2001) (finding that giving public or closed testimony to the truth 
commission produced neither a notable therapeutic effect nor a notable counter-therapeutic effect 
and that some individuals may have experienced testifying as either distressing or relieving); MARY 
E. HAWKESWORTH, GLOBALIZATION & FEMINIST ACTIVISM (2006) (providing an overview of 
victim testimony in tribunals on crimes against women that emulate war crime tribunals without any 
specific discussion of the therapeutic benefits of such testimony). 
 350.  Greene, supra note 330, at 233. 
 351.  Id. 
 352.  Id. at 239–41. 
 353.  Id. at 239. 
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historically male-biased legal system, and the abuser might file frivolous 
motions or claims or exploit opportunities to call the plaintiff back into court 
in an effort to assert dominance or create fear.
354
  A tort suit may also fail to 
satisfy the plaintiff’s need to be compensated by the defendant when a third 




Each victim needs to make an individualized decision about whether the 
potential benefits of tort litigation outweigh the possible drawbacks.  For 
some victims, the factors will weigh in favor of pursuing a tort suit.  In 
addition to the therapeutic benefits discussed above, there are supplemental 
benefits that arise out of using the tort system rather than the criminal justice 
system to address domestic violence harms. 
C.  Enhancement or Replacement of Criminal Justice Outcomes 
Domestic violence tort suits offer many of the positive outcomes 
available in criminal cases, but give the victim much greater control.  In fact, 
with criminal cases, the victim is often not even a party.  Domestic violence 
tort suits, on the other hand, offer a victim the opportunity not only to be a 
party, but also to control the litigation to a large degree.  Many of the 
potential outcomes offered by criminal cases—deterrence, punishment, 
accountability, and retribution—are also available through civil tort claims, 
but with the added benefit of the victim being at the helm. 
1. Primacy of the Victim 
In criminal domestic violence cases, the government sues the perpetrator 
for acts committed against the victim.  The victim’s interests are “considered 
relevant in the criminal justice system only to the extent that they coincide 
with the government’s interest in bringing the perpetrator to justice.”
356
  The 
police decide whether to arrest, and the prosecutor decides whether to 
                                                          
 354.  See Susan L. Miller & Nicole L. Smolter, “Paper Abuse”: When All Else Fails, Batterers 
Use Procedural Stalking, 17.5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 637 (2011) (exploring “[t]he barrage of 
men’s frivolous lawsuits, false reports of child abuse, and other system-related manipulations,” 
which “exert . . . power, force . . . contact, and financially burden . . . their ex-partners”); Mary 
Przekop, One More Battleground: Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and the Batterers’ Relentless 
Pursuit of Their Victims through the Courts, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 1053 (2011) (examining “the 
unfortunate prevalence and often unpunished abusive behavior perpetrated by batterers in our family 
courts”). 
 355.  Greene, supra note 330, at 240. 
 356.  Shuman, supra note 329, at 72 (citing Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the 
Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357 (1986)). 
  
746 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
prosecute.  The victim is almost never consulted about whether a criminal 
case is filed, how it will proceed, and what outcomes will be sought.  This is 
especially true in jurisdictions that follow mandatory arrest and mandatory 
prosecution policies.  In fact, interactions with the police and the criminal 




Domestic violence plaintiffs, as opposed to the state, can determine the 
course of the case in pursuing justice through tort claims.  As the potential 
plaintiff in a tort suit, the victim exercises significant power.  To start, the 
victim chooses whether to initiate a suit.  If she does file suit, the victim 
decides the legal theory for her case, and, except as limited by the power of 
the court and influence of the other party, what evidence she will present—
including factual evidence and expert testimony.
358
  She decides when to 
file—so long as it is within the statute of limitations—and has the power to 
settle or withdraw the claim at any point.  Tort cases also offer victims the 




Pursuing remedies through civil as opposed to criminal courts can offer 
additional therapeutic benefits to plaintiffs.  The control offered by a civil 
suit gives the plaintiff much more satisfaction with the judicial process.  
Studies have shown that when an individual is a more active participant in 
litigation and perceives that she has more control over the legal process and 
outcome, the process is more satisfying to that individual
360
 and seems 
fairer.
361
  Also, when individuals experience more control in litigation, they 
are more likely to feel that justice has been served.
362
  Victims particularly 
prefer a process in which they can participate, have a voice, and have some 
control.
363
  There is also some support for the idea that “by seizing control of 
the litigation, by speaking out, and bringing the perpetrator to justice,” the 
victim “can restore her self-control and self-respect.”
364
  In the domestic 
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violence context, when victims have control over the tort suit that they 
would not have in the criminal process, they are more likely to feel satisfied 
with the legal process, believe that the system is fair, and experience justice. 
2. Standard of Proof 
Tort suits also have a better chance of providing the victim with a 
favorable outcome, given the different standards of proof in civil and 
criminal cases.  In civil cases, the standard of proof is the preponderance of 
the evidence, while in criminal cases the standard of proof is the much 
higher “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Because the standard of proof for a tort 
action is significantly lower, the plaintiff may be more likely to succeed in 
imposing legal accountability, deterrence, and retribution for the defendant’s 
actions.  In the domestic violence context, a tort plaintiff will have a lower 
standard of proof in a civil court for proving the same or similar incidents of 
abuse.  If there has been a criminal conviction, the plaintiff may be able use 
that conviction to support issue preclusion or a motion for summary 
judgment related to the underlying act or acts in the tort case.
365
 
3.  Power Dynamics 
The civil system is also more likely than the criminal system to create an 
adjustment in the power dynamic between the victim and the abuser.  The 
criminal justice system is unlikely to address or correct the power imbalance 
between the victim and the perpetrator.
366
  In fact, the criminal system may 
recreate a power imbalance, with the criminal system and its players 
asserting dominance over the victim.
367
  Giving the victim legal power 
through the civil system is “empowerment per se” and holds particular 
significance in situations of power and control by an abuser.
368
 
[T]he victim’s decision to file and maintain a lawsuit may be a source 
of a cognitive shift. . . . Therefore, returning the initiative to the victim 
may help redefine her sense of self as empowered.  Filing a claim 
allows the plaintiff to regain control over her life; she changes from a 
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helpless victim to an active vindicator of her rights and interests.
369
 
By filing a tort claim, the victim rejects the abuser’s “claim of superiority 
and reasserts her autonomy.”
370
 
4.  Civil Claims in Lieu of Prosecution 
The availability of tort remedies to domestic violence victims can be 
particularly significant when the state declines to investigate or prosecute.  
This is especially true given the low prosecution rate of domestic violence 
crimes.  Statistics on domestic violence reporting, arrest, prosecution, and 
incarceration rates vary greatly depending on the study and the location of 
the study.  Most statistics reveal that individual victims rarely can rely on the 
criminal justice system to punish, deter, or control an abuser. 
One Department of Justice (DOJ) study found that in instances of 
physical assaults of women by an intimate partner, only 7.3% of the 
perpetrators were prosecuted.
371
  Of that number, 47.9% were convicted, and 
of those convicted, 35.6% were sentenced to jail or prison.
372
  In cases of 
intimate partner rape, only 7.5% of the perpetrators were prosecuted; of that 
number, 41.9% were convicted, and of those convicted, 69.2% were 
sentenced to jail or prison. 
373
  In another study funded by the DOJ and 
based on 135 studies, researchers determined that of reported domestic 
violence offenses, 35.5% were prosecuted, while 57.6% of domestic arrests 
were prosecuted.
374
  A well-publicized study in Milwaukee found that 95% 
of men arrested for domestic violence were not prosecuted, and of those 
prosecuted, only 1% of those prosecuted were convicted.
375
 
A DOJ Special Report found that of perpetrators who were charged with 
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a domestic violence crime, 81.5% were charged with only a misdemeanor, 
and about 18.5% were charged with a felony.
376
  The same report found that 
more than half of these charged defendants were convicted, and that of those 
convicted, more than 80% of the defendants received jail or prison time, 
with the remaining convicted defendants receiving probation.
377
  A survey of 
multiple studies of domestic violence criminal justice outcomes revealed that 
the percentage of perpetrators receiving jail sentences ranged from no more 
than 4% (in four of the studies) to 57% (in Brooklyn).
378
 
While the rates of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration vary, each study 
indicates percentages in which there are no outcomes whatsoever in the 
criminal case.  For instance, in the first-referenced DOJ study, if only 7.3% 
of perpetrators of intimate partner assault on women are prosecuted, 92.7% 
of perpetrators are not being prosecuted and the criminal justice system has 
not achieved an outcome for the victim.  This enormous gap indicates that 
the criminal justice system is not adequately serving victims and that other 
viable options, including remedies in tort, are needed. 
5.  Tort Claims when Victim Avoids the Criminal Process 
Tort claims are also a useful alternative when a victim prefers that the 
state not prosecute and the victim does not file a complaint, press charges, or 
participate in the prosecution.  There are a number of valid reasons why a 
victim may choose not to mobilize the criminal justice system.  The victim 
may not want the perpetrator to be incarcerated out of concern for the 
perpetrator or his children.
379
  The victim may eschew the involvement of 
the criminal system for financial reasons.  The victim and perhaps her 
children may be dependent on the perpetrator for financial support, including 
for housing, food, payment of household bills, child support, or alimony.
380
  
Additionally, the victim may know that the threat of criminal sanctions will 
not deter her particular abuser. 
Domestic violence torts can be a good option for victims given that a 
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high percentage of domestic violence criminal cases are dropped.  Statistics 
on dropped prosecutions vary.  In one study of cases filed in Chicago’s 
domestic violence court, 7,400 of 10,700—or 69% of—cases had been 
dropped.
381
  In another study in Detroit, only 2.6% of domestic assault cases 
brought to the attention of law enforcement resulted in adjudication.
382
  
Victim noncooperation plays a role in the high rates of prosecution failure.  




These high rates of noncooperation signify that the criminal justice 
system is not effective in meeting victims’ needs.  Tort remedies will not 
suit all victims either.  However, tort law does provide an important option 
given the problems presented by the criminal system. 
Many reasons that victims choose not to participate in prosecuting their 
abusers relate specifically to the criminal justice system.  Victims have cited 
the following as reasons not to cooperate: prior negative experiences with 
the criminal justice system, frustration with the process, having insufficient 
information about how the system works, concern with prosecution’s effect 
on children, emotional barriers such as love for the abuser and fear of 
retaliation, and lack of resources required to participate, such as time, 
money, emotional support, and transportation.
384
  Victims also have faced 
barriers such as getting the police to provide assistance and having the 
system follow through with charges.
385
  Some victims fear that invoking the 
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criminal justice system could lead to involvement of child protective 
services and possible removal of children from the home.
386
  Others 
correctly perceive that prosecution or incarceration will affect the victim’s 
ability to receive financial support from the abuser.
387
  A victim might 
choose to opt out of the criminal justice system because the process is too 
complicated, emotionally draining, burdensome, and “not worth the 
hassle.”
388
  However, a victim’s failure to participate does not necessarily 
mean that she is opposed to the prosecution of her abuser.  Barriers alone 
can be enough to thwart her participation.
389
 
Some of the barriers to participation in the criminal justice system may 
also dissuade victims from filing tort claims.  Victims may fear retaliation, 
including further violence,
390
 or withdrawal of financial support.
391
  Others 
may believe that abuse is a private or domestic matter.
392
  Love or affection 
for the batterer or hope for the relationship can also affect a victim’s 
decisions about whether to engage the legal system.  These factors may 
weigh against filing a domestic violence tort claim for some victims.  
However, many of the barriers to participating in the criminal justice system 
will not stand in the way of filing a tort case.  The victim may have no 
experience with the tort system, as opposed to a history of negative 
experiences with the criminal justice system.  Instead of risking losing 
financial support if the abuser were to be prosecuted or incarcerated, the 
victim may receive a substantial tort award, providing both immediate and 
future financial support. 
D.  Deterrence 
Domestic violence torts offer the potential to deter abusers from 
engaging in abusive conduct.  As discussed above, the criminal justice 
system—with its low rates of prosecution, arrest, and victim participation—
often fails to deter domestic violence.  Additionally, some domestic violence 
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perpetrators are not swayed by the threat of criminal sanctions, including 
arrest or possible incarceration.  Financial sanctions obtained through tort 
claims, however, can supplement or replace the deterrent effect of the 
criminal justice system. 
Deterrence is a foundational goal of tort law.  In the tort context, 
deterrence seeks to discourage certain conduct by imposing civil liability 
when the conduct causes harm.
393
  The aim of this deterrence generally is to 
discourage the public from engaging in certain conduct in order to avoid 
potential liability—as opposed to holding a party liable for tortious conduct 
to deter future such conduct.
394
  At least for now, the latter form of 
deterrence is more applicable in the domestic violence context.  Because so 
few domestic violence tort suits are filed, it is extremely unlikely that an 
abuser would be aware of this potential civil liability and alter his conduct to 
avoid it.  Until domestic violence tort law is well developed and well known, 
domestic violence torts will do little to deter abusive conduct before a 
lawsuit is filed.  One would hope that once domestic violence tort law 
becomes more established and well known, it will reduce abuse against 
intimate partners. 
Domestic violence torts also have the potential to deter subsequent 
abuse by holding perpetrators civilly liable for prior abusive conduct.  The 
abuser’s abusive acts will no longer be “private” after pleadings are filed and 
evidence of the abuse is presented.  A judge and possibly a jury will 
scrutinize the defendant’s behavior.  The court’s commitment of time and 
attention to the harms inflicted will emphasize the severity and wrongfulness 
of the abuser’s choices.  All of the above aspects of accountability occur 
even in the absence of a favorable decision for the plaintiff.
395
  In addition, 




If the domestic violence plaintiff prevails, the tort suit can offer even 
greater deterrence.  Payment of damages to the plaintiff will be a meaningful 
and negative consequence for the abuser’s behavior.  The defendant may 
experience payment of compensatory damages, meant to make the plaintiff 
“whole,” as punishment or retribution.  If punitive damages are awarded, the 
defendant is being explicitly punished for his conduct.  In addition, a 
judgment with a finding of liability for the defendant can make the 
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defendant feel “blamed, condemned, and humiliated.”
397
  This result can 
help to deter subsequent domestic violence. 
I had the opportunity to witness the deterrent value of a domestic 
violence tort case firsthand in Gyerko v. Gyerko.
398
  This case was litigated 
while I was co-supervising the Domestic Violence Clinic at Yale Law 
School with Robert Solomon.
399
  The parties, who were both natives of 
Romania, had divorced after a violent and traumatic thirty-three year 
marriage.  Throughout the marriage, the defendant continuously subjected 
the plaintiff to extreme physical, emotional, and sexual abuse.  During the 
two-year pendency of the divorce action, the defendant continued to threaten 
and stalk the plaintiff.  The defendant disregarded numerous civil restraining 
orders and criminal protective orders.  At one point during the pendency of 
the divorce action, the police installed a video camera in the plaintiff’s 
bedroom to dissuade the defendant from breaking into the plaintiff’s house.  
The defendant broke into the house and destroyed the video camera.  Civil 
restraining orders, criminal protective orders, arrest, prosecution, and 
incarceration did not deter the defendant.  We represented the plaintiff in 
filing a complaint alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and stalking.  
The complaint requested an amount equal to the defendant’s interest in the 
marital property, or $54,100.
400
  The facts of the case could have supported 
many other counts, including assault and battery, but the statute of 
limitations had run on those claims.  After a trial and a judgment for the 
plaintiff in the amount of $54,100, the defendant finally stopped his abusive 
behavior. 
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS 
While tort law provides many positive outcomes for domestic violence 
victims, its causes of action fail to capture some important aspects of 
domestic violence.  When an abuser perpetrates domestic violence, he 
intends not only to cause the immediate, intended harm, but also to establish 
power and control over the victim.  While tort actions can grant recovery for 
the emotional and physical harm of the immediate act of violence, they are 
not well suited to provide recovery for the harm caused by the control 
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exerted over the victim by the abuser. 
Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive control that constitutes an 
“institution of confinement.”
401
  Domestic violence “involves a pattern of 
coercive control that is often much more debilitating than the violence 
itself.”
402
  Coercive control is a 
course of calculated, malevolent conduct deployed almost exclusively 
by men to dominate individual women by interweaving repeated 
physical abuse with three equally important tactics: intimidation, 
isolation, and control.  Assault is an essential part of this strategy and is 
often injurious and sometimes fatal.  But the primary harm abusive men 
inflict is political, not physical, and reflects the deprivation of rights 
and resources that are critical to personhood and citizenship.
403
 
Domestic violence can be seen as a “‘liberty crime’ . . . in which the 
victim is deprived of basic freedoms in her personal life.”
404
  The loss of 
liberty inherent in the coercive control of domestic violence is a serious 
harm that is not easily quantifiable and cannot be addressed by existing 
common law tort claims.  This non-compensable harm is serious, causing 




Tort law may also fall short in addressing the effects of minor violence.  
Domestic violence is frequently defined by instances of severe violence, but 
often a victim’s most significant harm results from the effects of frequent 
and recurrent low-level violence inflicted on her as part of the abuser’s 
efforts to maintain control.
406
  While this low-level violence is actionable, 
plaintiffs may have more difficulty obtaining judicial recognition of these 
harms as opposed to more serious violence. 
Recovery for the harm caused by psychological abuse also may be 
difficult to seek in tort.  Psychological abuse, which can be particularly 
harmful in the context of physical and sexual abuse, may not be 
compensable outside the strict standards of IIED.  Psychological abuse 
encompasses a wide range of conduct intended to maintain domination over 
the victim.
407
  Domestic violence perpetrators frequently verbally abuse their 
                                                          
 401.  STARK, supra note 12, at 199. 
 402.  JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 46. 
 403.  STARK, supra note 12, at 5.  
 404.  JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 46–47. 
 405.  STARK, supra note 12, at 199.  
 406.  Id. at 242–43.  
 407.  DUTTON, supra note 23, at 25–27. 
  
2014] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS 755 
partners, including demeaning them with name-calling and degrading 
comments.
408
  The perpetrator will focus on the partner’s vulnerabilities and 
attack her value as an individual or as a mother, homemaker, family 
member, friend, employee, or member of the community.
409
  A perpetrator 
also may force a partner to engage in degrading conduct, like getting on her 
knees and using a toothbrush to clean up food smeared on the floor by the 
perpetrator or forcing her to pick up her children from a mistress’s home.
410
  
To control the victim, abusers sometimes threaten to take away, kidnap, or 
physically or emotionally abuse the victim’s children.
411
  This kind of 
emotional abuse, which causes serious harm to the victim, has no clear 
correlate for compensation in tort law. 
Tort claims generally do not compensate victims for losses that result 
from financial abuse.  Many domestic violence perpetrators use economic 
tools to further control and dominate their partners.
412
  Abusers create 
economic dependency and deprive victims of financial resources by 
restricting the victim’s ability to obtain or maintain employment or seek 
education.
413
  In one study, 46% of domestic violence victims reported that 
their abusers had forbidden them to work, and 25% reported that their 
abusers prevented them from attending school.
414
  Abusers often use 
financial control to trap the victim in the relationship.
415
  They frequently 
maintain complete control over financial resources—including money—and 
the food, transportation, shelter, clothing, and other basic necessities it 
provides.
416
  Abusers also often deprive victims of funds for basic needs or 
keep them on a strict allowance, providing minimal funds on an as-needed 
basis.
417
  Abusers often restrict or deny the victim access to financial 
resources, including the abuser’s employment income, family funds, and the 
victim’s income from her own employment.  These economic losses suffered 
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by the victim generally cannot be recouped through existing tort remedies.  
Tort law would need to be expanded to compensate victims for these losses, 
as well as lost or deferred educational or employment opportunities.
418
 
Tort claims also do not compensate for “social battering.”  Social 
battering is the social isolation and humiliation that is frequently imposed on 
victims by their abusers.
419
  Abusers generally seek to control an intimate 
partner’s attention, time, activities, and relationships with friends and 
family.
420
  They intentionally isolate the victim and attempt to control her 
time through accusations of spending too much time with family members, 
children, friends, and others.
421
  The abuser may prohibit his partner from 
socializing.  He may refuse to accompany her to social events or, if he does 
accompany her, may humiliate her publicly.
422
  These domestic violence 
harms do not have ready remedies in common law torts or even in specific 
domestic violence torts or gender-motivated violence suits. 
VI. PARADIGM SHIFT IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LAWYERING TOWARD 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS 
Despite its limitations, tort law offers numerous, largely untapped 
benefits to prospective domestic violence plaintiffs.  An increased focus on 
domestic violence tort law is an important step in a much-needed paradigm 
shift in domestic violence lawyering.  Criminal justice policies have become 
the primary strategy for addressing domestic violence.
423
  Currently, civil 
domestic violence lawyering focuses almost exclusively on restraining 
orders and family law cases—including child custody, child support, 
divorce, spousal support, and paternity matters.  Legal representation in 
these cases is undoubtedly vital.  However, this narrow approach fails 
domestic violence victims on many levels.  It prioritizes short-term safety, 
care of children, and legally terminating the relationship over other values 
like financial compensation, long-term financial security, victim 
empowerment, deterrence, and abuser accountability.  It also neglects the 
other legal needs of victims—including assistance with housing, public 
benefits, employment, immigration, consumer, and other matters.  A 
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continued focus on civil restraining orders and family law diverts attention 
away from other productive avenues for relief, especially tort law.  Tort 
claims need to comprise a much larger percentage of legal actions brought to 
address domestic violence. 
Employing tort law to address domestic violence harms is an important 
step in the development of legal doctrine that reflects sex equality in its 
handling of violence.  Filing tort claims for domestic violence will bring 
intimate partner violence out of family courts.  Family courts are often seen 
as forums for “private” matters.  Domestic violence tort claims are heard in 
general civil courts, giving these claims the same level of importance as 
other claims between strangers or non-intimate parties. 
Offering a dignified forum for domestic violence victims to pursue their 
claims will give them a chance to experience greater justice.  Having a court 
conduct a dignified proceeding about the domestic violence the victim has 
suffered conveys to the victim that it takes her and her harm seriously.  The 
proceeding itself can assure the victim of her importance and that domestic 
violence is a serious matter.
424
 
Opening up this field of litigation will affirm the unacceptability of 
domestic violence.  After more tort claims are filed, courts will become 
accustomed to adjudicating such claims.  This will encourage more attorneys 
to file domestic violence tort actions and create victim awareness of the 
benefits offered by these actions.  If these tort claims become commonplace, 
they could alter abusive behavior throughout society.  On the individual 
level, a tort suit or the threat of a tort suit could deter abusive conduct in 
individual relationships.  We should aspire to create a new approach to the 
representation of domestic violence victims in which cases are frequently 
litigated, domestic violence victims are supported, and intimate partners 
engage in little or no abusive conduct. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
It is time to bring tort law to the fore of domestic violence advocacy.  
Coverture, chastisement, and spousal immunity historically shielded abusers 
                                                          
 424.  Lind et al., supra note 360, at 981 (“[D]ignified procedures tend to provoke favorable 
responses because under them litigants feel that the court accords importance to the persons and 
subject matter involved in the dispute. Thus, for our tort litigants, the fact the court was willing to 
undertake a dignified hearing of the dispute may have constituted evidence that the civil justice 
system took the litigants and the dispute seriously. The fact that their case was deemed important 
enough to receive so respectuful a hearing was probably quite flattering. After all, the trial was in all 
likelihood one of the most meticulous, most individualized interactions that the litigant had ever 
experienced in the course of his or her contacts with government agencies.”). 
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from civil liability.  Coverture and chastisement have been eliminated, and 
spousal immunity has been limited or abrogated in almost all states.  
Insurance policy exclusions and recalcitrant courts continue to pose 
obstacles to domestic violence tort suits.  Domestic violence plaintiffs and 
their lawyers need to engage courts and the insurance industry to remove the 
remaining obstacles to domestic violence tort suits.  States should legislate 
specific domestic violence tort causes of action, and courts should welcome 
novel domestic violence tort claims.  Through increased attention to 
domestic violence tort law, we can overcome the vestiges of chastisement, 
coverture, spousal immunity, and outdated sexist courts. 
Domestic violence victims are independent legal beings who can sue 
spouses and intimate partners for tortious domestic violence acts. Domestic 
violence torts have not been a predominate aspect of our laws or popular 
culture.  Now that these archaic doctrines of gender discrimination have 
been removed, lawyers should bring these claims into the mainstream legal 
landscape. 
 
